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ABSTRACT 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in July 2002 in response to major accounting 
scandals.  This thesis investigates the announcement effects surrounding the passage of SOX to 
examine the differential impact of SOX on U.S. publicly traded companies.  As the Act requires 
greater transparency of financial reporting and imposes burden on managers through mandatory 
CEO/CFO certification of financial statements, the associated compliance costs create a 
significant loss in total market value that amounts to $1.4 trillion (Zhang 2005).  It is predicted 
that SOX has a disproportionate negative impact on small firms due to the fixed cost component 
of the compliance costs and the characteristics of small firms (i.e. they compete on flexibility but 
SOX limits it).  Previous studies show that the imposed compliance costs lead to a significant 
number of firms going dark or private in the post-SOX period, which suggests that the imposed 
compliance costs outweigh the induced benefits of SOX to shareholders (Engel 2004).  While 
past studies have been done to examine the effect of SOX on public firms in general, this thesis 
is specifically interested in how different firm sizes react differentially to the events leading the 
passage of SOX.  Through the event study methodology, the event day effect on stock returns 
and abnormal returns will be examined to see if the market also perceives the Act to have a 
negative impact on firms.   
 
I. BACKGROUND 
With the high-profile corporate corruptions in the U.S. in 2001-2002, the Congress 
swiftly enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act or SOX hereafter) to improve the accuracy and 
reliability of financial reporting.  SOX creates a regulatory body to oversee the accounting 
industry and imposes numerous significant and potentially far-reaching reforms in public 
company governance and disclosure requirements.  The confluence of surrounding events, 
including the plummeting stock markets, approaching elections, and the summer recess, created 
a charged political environment that put tremendous pressure on Congress and the President to 
pass the legislation (Zhang 2005).  The complexity of the Act and the lightning speed of its 
passage raise questions on its economic consequences on U.S. publicly traded firms and its 
purpose in restoring investors’ confidence.  SOX is one of the most sweeping revisions of the 
federal securities laws in the last 60 years.  When President Bush signed the Act into law, he 
described it as “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt.” (White House Corporate Accountability Reform) 
Unlike previous federal regulations that are mainly concerned with disclosure 
requirements, SOX has a number of major provisions that are actual mandates.  They introduce 
significant changes in both management’s reporting responsibilities and the scope of the 
responsibilities of the auditor.  The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) that 
SOX creates requires external auditors to submit opinions on manager’s assessments as well as 
their own evaluation of control effectiveness (Li 2006).  Other responsibilities of PCAOB 
include registering public accounting firms, establishing standards related to preparation of audit 
reports to issuers, and overseeing public accounting firms.  SOX includes other major provisions 
that prohibit auditors from performing non-audit services for their audit clients, call for audit 
committee independence, require executive certification concerning the quality of internal 
controls, and prohibit corporations from extending credit to executives.  Among these provisions, 
Section 404 of the Act is considered the most costly provision to corporations.  Section 404 
imposes an extensive obligation on managers to assess the quality and effectiveness of internal 
controls (Butler et al. 2006).  While these provisions improve corporate governance and enhance 
the quality of financial reporting, they also promote audit effectiveness by regulating the 
potential conflict of interest between auditors, legal counsel, and analysts, and increasing the 
criminal and civil liability for violations of securities laws.   (For further details of SOX 
provisions, please refer to Appendix II.) 
Given the extensive provisions of SOX, the Act affects social costs in a two-fold manner.  
SOX is socially beneficial to investors by protecting investors and increasing investors’ 
confidence.  By minimizing accounting frauds, SOX shields investors from potential investment 
risks due to corporate frauds.  As the Act increases transparency of financial reporting, it also 
prevents investors from making ill-informed investment decisions due to the accounting 
manipulations of firms.  However, SOX increases social costs by restricting companies from 
making changes.  As explained further in the next few paragraphs, SOX provisions may increase 
social costs by discouraging acquisitions of smaller firms by larger firms.  Firms often want to 
avoid the lengthy work of reevaluating their internal controls as required by the executive 
certification provision, so they may give up the opportunities for new acquisitions or other 
significant changes that would affect their internal controls.  As a result, companies would rather 
stay safe and avoid implementing new ideas. 
Although SOX is claimed to restore investors’ confidence, the associated direct 
compliance costs may also outweigh the stated benefits.  As SOX requires deeper oversight of 
financial reporting, it changes managements’ reporting responsibilities and imposes more 
stringent responsibilities on the auditor.  According to the SEC’s initial estimate, implementing 
Section 404 “would impose an additional 5 burden hours (equivalent to $375) per issuer in 
connection with each quarterly and annual report.” (Butler et al. 2006) This estimate was later 
revised to around $91,000 per company, not including “additional cost burdens that a company 
will incur as a result of having to obtain an auditor’s attestation.”  (Butler et al. 2006) 
Nonetheless, SEC’s revised cost estimate was far lower than the estimated compliance costs 
computed by Financial Executives International (FEI) and AMR Research.  While FEI surveyed 
224 public companies and estimated that the first year compliance cost would increase 53% to $3 
million, AMR Research estimated that companies will spend $6 billion to comply with SOX in 
2006 (Butler et al. 2006).  The likelihood that the compliance costs of SOX outweigh its benefits 
is again asserted by an August 2003 survey of executives by CFO Magazine.  This survey 
indicates that 70% of the respondents did not believe that the benefits of complying with SOX 
justify with its costs (Zhang 2005). 
The SOX provisions concerning internal control place a disproportionately negative 
burden on small firms.  Small firms have higher overhead costs per unit of capitalization 
compare with large firms.  These firms often compete through flexibility – the ability to change 
business plans rapidly to meet customer needs.  SOX may have a disproportionately negative 
impact on small firms by imposing stringent and inflexible rules and increasing overhead costs.  
For instance, one study found that the provision regarding audit committee independence 
imposes an increased cost from $5.91 to $9.76 to independent directors per $1,000 in sales after 
SOX for small firms, while it only imposes an increased cost from $0.13 to $0.15 per $1,000 in 
sales for large firms (Butler et al. 2006).  Small firms may also be disproportionately affected, 
because they tend to have a larger portion of non-independent board members.  As a result, they 
need to make more changes to internal control in order to comply with the new rules (Butler et al. 
2006).   
SOX also imposes costs by causing firms, especially small firms, to either go private or 
stay privately held.  The Act imposes a disproportionately negative impact on small firms as they 
tend to find internal control problems.  The internal control reporting provision is inherently less 
beneficial for small firms as they pose a lower risk of business failure to the economy.  
Furthermore, small firms benefit less from internal control structures, because they rely on 
managers who can often override internal controls (Butler et al. 2006).  The disproportional 
negative impact that SOX places on small firms causes these firms to reduce their public 
ownership by either becoming privately held or going dark (Engel 2006).  As public ownership 
enables diversification of risk that makes it cheaper for diversified stockholders to bear risks, 
SOX reduces the flow of resources to riskier firms like small firms and startup ventures.  This 
may potentially limit innovation and invention.   
By shifting risk-bearing responsibilities to firms, SOX distorts executives’ incentives and 
investment decisions.  Because SOX demands the attention of all board members and senior 
officers of all publicly traded firms, it may potentially divert managers’ attention from 
maximizing shareholder value.  Since the Act exposes managers to greater risk of SOX liability 
and rigid penalties, executives are likely to take less risky activities.  In some cases, executives 
choose to leave publicly traded firms for private equity firms (Zhang 2005).  This increases the 
agency costs of companies when firms spend too much time and resources on complying with 
SOX, or when managers are too risk averse to take on positive net present value projects to 
maximize firm value (Butler et al. 2006).  The reallocation of risks consequently changes 
executives’ business strategies, potentially reducing firm value.   
In addition to the direct and indirect compliance costs that SOX imposes on publicly 
traded firms, it is also costly for firms to eliminate all corporate fraud.  In order to minimize 
frauds, stringent controls often remove most discretion and flexibility in business (Zhang 2005).  
The costs of inflexibility may outweigh the benefits of reducing the number of scandals (i.e. 
increasing investors’ confidence and enhancing firm’s reputation).  The shift to more rigid 
federal regulation reduces the flexibility of the current governance systems and environment, 
which in turns causes extensive changes in the economy (Zhang 2005).  According to the New 
York Times, a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey of CEOs at the World Economic Forum in 2004 
finds that 59% of the respondents view the risk of overregulation as one of the biggest threats 
hindering growth opportunities of their firms (Zhang 2005). 
Despite the fact that SOX is socially beneficial by increasing shareholders’ confidence, 
the costs of the Act, especially its disproportionate impact on small firms, may outweigh its 
benefits.  In order to determine the differential effect of SOX by firm size, this paper examines 
the market reaction to the events surrounding the passage of SOX.  A maintained hypothesis is 
that SOX has a disproportionately negative impact on small firms due to the higher direct and 
indirect costs that these firms incur.  SOX affects all publicly traded firms, it imposes a 
systematic risk to the market, so I control for market returns.  I examine the daily stock returns of 
587 randomly selected firms from three stock markets (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ), and 
these markets consist a total of 723 industries.  I find that the stock returns and abnormal returns 
around the events leading to the passage of SOX are significantly negative, and the negative 
effect grows as firm size decreases.  The significant negative effect on stock returns and 
abnormal returns demonstrates that SOX reduces the value of firms to shareholders.  Since it is 
difficult to determine the size of the societal benefits of SOX, my findings do not directly 
conclude that the costs of SOX outweigh its societal benefits.  However, the reduced stock value 
suggests that current shareholders perceive the passage of SOX to have a negative effect on firms.  
This may indicate that the market also thinks costs of SOX are likely to outweigh the benefits.  
Lastly, my finding shows that a firm’s industry has no effect on its stock returns or abnormal 
returns.   
This study conducts a cross-sectional test on stock price returns and abnormal returns 
around the events leading to the passage of SOX during the period February 2002 to August 
2002.  I examine fifteen events that may change investors’ expectations.  The selection of these 
events is based on prior event studies related to SOX.  These studies include Zhang 2005, Rezaee 
and Jain 2005, Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2005, and Li et al. 2006.  To assess the differential 
impact of SOX on returns of small firms, it can be assumed that if benefits of compliance 
outweigh costs, the value of the firm will increase; similarly, if compliance costs outweigh 
benefits, the stock price of the firm will drop.  The empirical results largely support the 
hypothesis that SOX has a negative effect on publicly traded firms and the effect increases 
inversely with firm size.   
While existing event studies mostly investigate the effect of SOX on public firms in 
general, this paper extends that literature by examining the differential effect of SOX on small 
firms.  It is important to understand how the Act affects publicly traded firms, in particular small 
firms, and how the market interprets the information conveyed by the passage of the Act.  This 
study provides evidence documenting the disproportionately negative return and abnormal return 
on small firms around events leading to the passage of SOX.  The findings have important 
implications for both researchers and policymakers.   
Stock prices convey noisy information that reflects the value of a firm.  Stock price does 
not only reflect firm, however.  It also changes according to the market trends and the economy.  
Stock price is comprised of the expected return and the unexpected return.  Abnormal return of a 
stock refers to the part of a stock’s return that is unanticipated due to an event.  Abnormal returns 
are associated with unanticipated changes in value due to some events, they are useful in 
determining the correlation between pre-SOX events and stock prices (Chhaochharia et al. 2005).  
They help us better understand how the events surrounding the passage of SOX affect market 
behaviors, and more importantly, what implications those changes in market behaviors have for 
the costs and benefits of SOX (i.e. an increase in stock prices implies SOX enhances public 
confidence, but a decrease in stock prices entails the possibility that the public views SOX as a 
financial burden for firms).  However, the impact of other contemporaneous news 
announcements is incorporated in stock prices as well.  Although no other news on the selected 
event days is likely to be the key driver of the documented returns, it is impossible to completely 
eliminate other confounding factors that stock prices might have incorporated into (Zhang 2005).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses prior research 
related to SOX and event studies.  Section III presents the hypothesis.  Section IV summarizes 
SOX event history and describes empirical methods.  Section V analyzes the empirical results.  
Section VI concludes and proposes possible extensions of this study.   
II. EXISTING RESEARCH 
Prior Studies on the Effect of SOX 
Effects of SOX have been a controversial topic among researchers since it was first 
considered.  Romano (2004) evaluates the substantive corporate governance mandates of SOX 
and identifies whether specific provisions can be most accurately characterized as efficacious or 
not.  Her findings suggest that SOX’s corporate governance provisions are ill-conceived, which 
she suggests were due to the charged political environment surrounding the passage of SOX.  
Several studies, as discussed below, have been conducted to examine the impact of the Act on 
abnormal returns.  However, there is no consensus on how SOX changes the value of publicly 
traded firms.  This section discusses what is known so far regarding the effects of SOX.   
Several studies have been conducted to study SOX’s effect on the overall market. They 
focus on the effect of the passage of SOX on firm value.  Zhang (2005) presents the most 
extensive study of the economic consequences of SOX.  She finds that the cumulative abnormal 
returns surrounding legislative events leading to the passage of SOX are significantly negative, 
and the loss in total market value of firms surrounding those events is $1.4 trillion.  If SOX is 
effective in protecting investors, the market prices of firms with weak governance should 
increase with the passage of SOX (Butler et al. 2006).  Zhang shows, however, that the market 
values of firms with weak corporate governance decrease as the likelihood of the passage of 
SOX increases.  This indicates that shareholders believed that the compliance costs to poorly 
governed firms would exceed the benefits. 
While Zhang (2005) finds that enactment of SOX is associated with negative cumulative 
abnormal return, other studies show that positive stock returns surround events leading to the 
passage of SOX.  Li et al. (2006) examines stock price reactions to events surrounding SOX and 
focuses on the effect of earnings management on these reactions.  Although the study finds 
positive abnormal stock returns associated with SOX events, it finds no significant difference 
between SOX events and stock returns on firms that have been managing earnings or that have 
fully independent audit committees.  This indicates that the market does not expect SOX reforms 
in these areas to be meaningful.   
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005) examine the announcement effect of governance rules 
(not SOX per se but SEC regulations as well) on firm value and finds that governance rules have 
a positive impact on the value of large firms but no significant effect on small firms.  Those 
findings suggest that, on average, large firms that require more changes to comply with the rules 
outperform firms that need to make fewer changes, but small firms that need to make more 
changes underperform those that need to make fewer changes.  This indicates that the market 
believed that the costs of governance rules outweigh their benefits in small firms.   
Jain and Rezaee (2005) examine the relation between events that are favorable to SOX’s 
enactment and market reaction.  They show that favorable events are associated with positive 
stock returns, and firms that are better governed before SOX perform better after SOX.  This is 
consistent with the distinction between well and poorly governed firms as illustrated in Zhang 
(2005).  Since more compliant firms have both lower compliance costs and lower benefits from 
SOX reforms, it is unclear why they would enjoy more positive stock returns during SOX-related 
events (Butler et al. 2006).  It is likely that firms that were previously spending more on 
compliance perform better after SOX, and those that were previously less compliant are now 
forced to incur higher costs in order to remain public.  
Other studies create serious doubts about whether SOX is worth the cost.  Bhattacharya et 
al. (2003) examine the effectiveness of the executive certification provision in SOX.  They 
examine whether shareholders consider certification (or absence of certification) to be good news, 
bad news, or no news.  This study finds that firms’ share prices do not react to the presence or 
absence of certification, which suggests that the effectiveness of executive certification is low as 
the market could also separate good from bad firms without certification.  Another study presents 
evidence that the market does not react much to the high-cost information that is revealed due to 
SOX provisions.  For example, Ogneva et al. (2006) examine the relation between the implied 
cost of equity and the internal control effectiveness of firms.  Their findings suggest that firms 
disclosing weaknesses in internal controls have a marginally higher cost of equity, but such 
differences are mainly associated with general economic characteristics of disclosing firms.  
These studies cast doubt on the effectiveness of the provisions of SOX. 
Some findings suggest that SOX’s enactment imposes a negative economic burden on 
U.S. publicly traded firms, while other studies show that many of these firms decide to go private 
or get listed on foreign exchanges after the passage of SOX.  Engel et al. (2004) examine firms’ 
going-private decisions in response to SOX and argue that firms go private in response to SOX 
only if the compliance costs of SOX exceed the induced benefits.  Results show that SOX causes 
more firms to go private, and there is a trend of fewer getting listed on the NYSE and more on 
foreign stock exchanges.  This suggests that the compliance costs of SOX outweigh its benefits 
to firms, so firms need to avoid strict regulations and high compliance costs by going private or 
going public abroad.   
Studies of SOX frequently display contradictory findings.  They are sensitive to the 
events selected for measuring stock price effects.  One explanation maybe that the studies that 
finding positive stock price effects include a period of rising stock prices that occurred after the 
passage of SOX had been assured.  Therefore, the market had already anticipated the Act’s effect 
and the news is most likely incorporated into stock prices.  On the other hand, the studies that 
find negative stock returns focus on an earlier period of sharp market declines prior to the 
passage of SOX.  This period is around the time when events, such as President Bush’s July 9 
speech, calling for strong legislation, make it evident that strong legislation would pass (Butler et 
al. 2006).  Despite the fact that these studies examine slightly different events leading to various 
research findings, the results are still inconclusive because it is difficult to infer causation when 
the stock price includes other confounding factors as well.   
Prior Studies on Industry Opacity 
Industry opacity refers to the quality of the firms’ financial reporting in a particular 
industry being clear and transparent.  We care about the relationship between SOX and industry 
opacity, because the main purpose of the Act is to increase investors’ confidence through making 
firms’ financial reporting more transparent.  As SOX increases the transparency of firms, it 
minimizes the chance for investors from making ill-informed decisions.   
In addition to the available research on market reactions to SOX-related events, there are 
other studies that examine the effect of industry opacity on stock returns.  Morgan (2000) 
investigates the dispersion of bond ratings on banks and insurance companies and concludes that 
they are intrinsically more opaque than are other firms.  The nature of those businesses (i.e. high 
leverage, frequent trading, lending to opaque borrowers, doing businesses with risky clients) lead 
to uncertainty for outsiders, which causes higher discrepancy between bond raters.  While 
Morgan (2002) suggests that banks and insurance companies are inherently more opaque, Ang et 
al. (2001) finds that a firm’s stock return is positively correlated with firm’s transparency.  While 
they find that transparent firms (firms with lower dispersion and error of annual earnings 
forecasts) significantly outperform less-transparent companies (firms with higher dispersion and 
error of annual earnings forecasts), their results do not suggest that those firm’s industry is a 
driving factor.  In other words, transparency of individual firms has an effect on the firm’s stock 
returns, but transparency of the industry that the sample companies belong to does not have 
significant effect on those firms’ stock returns. 
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Although some claims have been made that there is no need for policy interventions 
because market correction mechanisms provide incentives for firms to adopt the most efficient 
and effective corporate governance mechanisms, history shows that market-based governance 
alone fails to protect investors and thus regulations are needed.  Some argue that if firms do not 
adopt effective corporate governance, they are presumed to be less efficient in the long run, and 
will consequently be replaced (Rezaee et al. 2003).  Nonetheless, the spectacular crashes of 
Enron, WorldCom, and other corporations due to accounting scandals illustrate that market 
correction mechanisms per se could not solve corporate governance issues.  When the public 
information provided by companies is questionable, investors face a heightened risk of trading 
against a privately informed insider and incurring losses in their trades (Rezaee et al. 2003). This 
is likely to explain why the stock market plummeted in 2001 to 2002, and why SOX is enacted.   
The ostensible purpose of SOX is to restore investors’ confidence by requiring higher 
quality earnings through regulations on audit quality and audit committee effectiveness.  The Act 
consists of mandatory disclosure and corporate governance regulations that are claimed to 
benefit all publicly traded companies.  If SOX improves corporate governance without imposing 
higher costs, it would lead to an increase in investor confidence, a decrease in the cost of capital, 
and an increase in firm value (Li et al. 2006).  It is claimed that these provisions would improve 
the accuracy and reliability of accounting information reported to investors.  As a result, 
investors would have more confidence in publicly traded firms, which would in turn increase the 
value of these firms. 
 Despite the fact that SOX is claimed to enhance firm value by increasing the level of 
corporate governance, it is argued that such level of corporate governance is much higher than 
the presumably optimized level.  If this is the case, the associated compliance costs would 
outweigh the induced benefits of the Act.  Unlike previous federal regulations, SOX is not only 
concerned with disclosure requirements.  It has actual mandates to introduce significant changes 
in both management’s reporting responsibilities and the scope of the responsibilities of the 
auditor.  The creation of the PCAOB, additional requirements for executive certifications and 
audit committee independence, prohibition of non-audit services, more transparent and timely 
financial disclosures, and stiffer penalties impose significant compliance costs that are illustrated 
by numerous research findings.  These stringent provisions may outweigh SOX’s benefits to 
shareholders.   
 Although research shows that the compliance costs vary depending on the firm’s 
compliance level prior to the passage of SOX, all firms experience a significant amount of 
compliance costs due to the stringent provisions of SOX.  A survey conducted by the Business 
Roundtable shows that firms encounter a compliance cost with the Act ranging from $1 million 
to more than $10 million, with 22 percent of the sampled firms estimating costs at more than $10 
million (Li et al. 2006).  SOX’s compliance costs include:  
1) Costs of executive certifications;  
2) Costs associated with reporting and assessing internal controls quality;  
3) Management and staffing requirements (i.e. costs of hiring independent board 
members, financial experts for the audit committee, legal counsel for monitoring 
compliance, setting up a whistleblower program, and training employees); 
4) Opportunity costs associated with the decreased flexibility and the misallocation of 
managerial talents and risks (Li et al. 2006). 
According to Zhang (2005), these costs amount to a loss of $1.4 trillion in the market value of 
publicly traded firms.  This amount is the change in the total market value of NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ between July 8, 2002 and July 26, 2002 (event 11, 12, and 13).  These high 
compliance costs cause numerous publicly traded firms to go private or go public on foreign 
exchanges (Engel 2004). 
 Based on the discussed analyses and prior research, the first alternative hypothesis is 
formulated as follows: 
“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a negative impact on the abnormal returns of U.S. 
publicly traded firms.” 
The second argument is that SOX’s provisions concerning internal control place a 
disproportionately heavy burden on small firms.  Research shows that the provisions of SOX are 
less beneficial to small firms, as they increase overhead costs and lower flexibility that small 
firms rely on when competing with large firms.  Small firms are also disadvantaged, because 
they tend to have larger portion of non-independent board members.  As a result, they need to 
make more changes to internal control in order to comply with the new rules (Butler et al. 2006).  
In addition to the direct compliance costs that SOX imposes on small firms, the enactment of 
SOX also makes it more probable for small firms to find internal control problems.  These 
difficulties make it more costly for firms to go or stay public.  As a result, the second hypothesis 
is: 
“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have a negative effect on the abnormal returns of U.S. 
publicly traded firms.  This effect increases as firm size decreases.” 
One claimed benefit of SOX is to improve the transparency of accounting information 
reported to investors in order to strengthen investors’ confidence, so the Act should have a 
positive impact on firms in the opaque industries.  This premise is based on the study of Ang et 
al. (2001), which suggests a positive correlation between stock returns and firm transparency.  
According to Morgan (2002), banks and insurance companies are inherently more opaque.  
Based on these findings, I propose my third hypothesis: 
“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have a positive impact on the abnormal returns of 
U.S. publicly traded companies in more opaque industries.” 
This hypothesis does not contradict my first and second hypotheses.  Although my first 
and second hypotheses claim that SOX has a negative impact on firms as the associated 
compliance costs may outweigh the induced benefits, the third hypothesis is based on a separate 
argument.  SOX increases the compliance costs of all publicly traded firms, small firms in 
particular, due to the nature of these companies.  Therefore, SOX should negatively affect small 
firms.  On the other hand, SOX should have a positive impact on firms in opaque industries, 
because it would make those industries more transparent.  Firms in the opaque industries, 
however, may or may not bear a disproportionately greater economic burden due to the 
compliance costs associated with the Act.   
Methodology of Testing Hypotheses 
Similar to other regulations, market reacts to the passage of SOX as a function of both the 
expected benefits and the associated costs that the Act imposes on publicly traded companies.  
To assess the impact of SOX on the stock markets, it can be assumed that if the induced benefits 
of compliance outweigh the costs, the value of the firm would increase; similarly, if the 
compliance costs outweigh the Act’s induced benefits to shareholders, the stock price of the firm 
would react negatively.  The net benefits of SOX’s provisions can be measured in terms of the 
changes in market reactions to legislative events leading up to the passage of SOX (Li et al. 
2006).   
In order to observe how the market reacts to the passage of SOX, these hypotheses are 
tested using a number of variables.  Dependent variables are the return and abnormal return on 
stock price for individual firms.  Return on stock price is defined as the daily change in the value 
of each individual firm.  Abnormal return on stock price is defined as the difference between the 
actual return and the expected return calculated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  The 
independent variables are the market return, the occurrence of event that is related to the passage 
of SOX, and the firm size that is determined based on the market capitalization of firms.  The 
market return is the required return on the market portfolio.  The list of events is illustrated in 
Appendix 1 Table 2.  There are a total of five different types of events related to the passing of 
bills in the House, the passing of bills in the Senate, the signing of the bill into law, the 
introduction of bills in the House, Senate, and the committee, and the introduction of bills in the 
committee.  Each event signals different level of likelihood for the enactment of SOX.  This 
research investigates the differences in stocks return and abnormal return for all fifteen events 
combined as well as the separate impact of different types of events (subset of the fifteen events) 
leading to the passage of SOX.   
The industry group of firms is controlled for in this study.  “Industry group” is included 
as a control variable because the difference between industry groups might affect the stock return 
and abnormal return depending on the opacity of the industry.  As explained in the above section, 
depository institutions (banks) and insurance carriers (insurance companies) are intrinsically 
more opaque than other industries.  These industries are included as variables in the regression 
model as I am particularly interested in examining the effect of SOX events on these industries.   
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN  
Timeline of Events 
The reported financial scandals in 2001-2002 occurred in many industries, which led to 
Congressional and regulatory responses that are applicable to all U.S. publicly traded companies.  
I identify the legislative events leading to the passage of SOX by leveraging existing research 
that studies the impact of SOX on market reactions.  Existing research includes Zhang 2005, 
Rezaee and Jain 2005, Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2005, Li et al. 2006.  These events were 
crosschecked with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) via Factiva to 
verify the event dates.  Verifying the event dates from these two sources allows me to extract the 
legislative activities that are most relevant to the business community.  The description of the 
events is summarized in Appendix I Table 2.   
There was no significant development in rulemaking in 2001 (Hilzenrath, December 12, 
2001, Washington Post).  The regulatory overhaul was first signaled on January 16, 2002 when 
SEC Chairman Pitt announced a reform plan to propose an independent regulatory organization 
(Zhang 2005), but SOX was not expected until the bill H.R. 3763 (Corporate and Auditing 
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002) was introduced in the House 
Financial Services Committee on February 13 (Schroeder, February 12, 2002, WSJ).  The intent of 
H.R. 3763 was to strengthen auditor independence and establish a public accounting regulatory 
board.  After Representative Oxley’s accounting reform bill in February, House Democrats 
continued to draft bills that strengthened the provisions in H.R. 3763 (Schroeder, March 7, 2002 
and April 23, 2002, WSJ).   
SOX was a combination of the accounting reform bills of Senator Paul Sarbanes and 
Representative Michael Oxley.  H.R. 3763 was passed in the House Financial Services 
Committee on April 16 and in the House on April 24 on a 334 to 90 vote.  According to Li et al. 
(2006), H.R. 3763 was considered to be a business-friendly and moderate overhaul of accounting 
oversight and corporate financial reporting.  After a series of activities in the House, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee approved legislation imposing felony charges for securities fraud and 
shredding or mishandling documents on April 25.  Senator Sarbanes circulated a tough reform 
bill in the Senate Banking Committee on May 8 proposing a major overhaul of accounting 
practices.  The bill was well supported and backed by Democrats in the Committee on June 11.  
The S.E.C proposed rules on June 12 to require executives to certify financial reports.  Senator 
Sarbanes’ reform bill was passed in the Committee on June 18, and his bill S.2673 (Public 
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002) was introduced in the Senate 
on June 25. 
In addition to the multiple actions taken in Congress, President Bush and former Federal 
Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, also addressed the issue.  President Bush first responded to 
the accounting scandals by unveiling a plan on March 7, 2002 to improve corporate disclosure 
and CEO and auditor responsibility for financial reporting.  Although Alan Greenspan warned 
against too much regulation and expressed his concern on the effect of regulations on market 
performance on March 26, he suggested in his speech that a stringent regulation on corporate 
governance is expected.   
After the announcement of WorldCom fraud on June 25, the rulemaking process 
accelerated.  Subsequent to S.E.C. filing the suit against WorldCom and requiring CEO/CFO 
certifications on June 26, President Bush gave a speech on Wall Street on July 9 suggesting that 
the passage of S.2673 was virtually assured (Cummings, July 9, 2002, WSJ and Murray, July 9, 
2002, WSJ).  S.2673 was passed 97 to 0 in the Senate on July 15.  On the same day, the House 
introduced H.R.5118 (Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002) to require certification of 
financial statements by top executives and impose additional criminal penalties for financial 
report misrepresentation.  The House passed H.R. 5118 on July 16 on a 391 to 28 vote, followed 
by the issuance and passage of the Conference Report on July 24 and July 25, which was since 
known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Oppel, July 25, 2002, NYT).  S.E.C. posted names of 
CEOs and CFOs who failed to certify their companies’ financial reports on its website on July 29, 
and it mandated that the deadline for filing the initial CEO/CFO financial report certifications 
was 5:00p.m. on August 14.  According to Li et al. (2006), market participants paid close 
attention to updates about certifications throughout the day on August 14.  President Bush signed 
the bill into law on July 30 (Bumiller, August 1, 2002, NYT).  As Li et al. (2006) described, SOX 
is the most important legislation dealing with financial reporting in the U.S. since the passage of 
the Securities Act of 1933.   
 This study examines into the impact of fifteen legislative events leading to the passage of 
SOX.  As described in Appendix 1, events are further divided into five classifications.  The first 
and second type of event refers to the event days when bills are passed in the House or the 
Senate.  The third type of event is related to the signing of bills by the President.  The fourth type 
of event corresponds to the introduction of bills in the House, the Senate, or the committee, and 
the fifth type of event focuses on the introduction of bills in the committee.  
 The event window for each is determined by existing research.  Existing research mostly 
uses narrow event windows in order to minimize the effect of other contemporaneous events.  It 
generally ranges from one day prior the event to one day after the event.  The length of event 
windows varies depending on the level of uncertainty of the event.  For instance, events that have 
higher level of uncertainty on the passage of SOX have a longer event window in order to 
include possible postponement of the effect.   
Sample Selection 
The sample consists of 587 public companies that are listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ.  It is randomly chosen from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
historical data that covers roughly 26,500 stocks.  A list of all companies is first obtained from 
CRSP, then I apply the random number generator method in Excel to randomly pick the firms.   
I extract security return, market return of the S&P 500, market capitalization (market 
value), and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code for these companies for all of the test 
dates as shown in Table 2.  The historical data for the risk free rate were obtained from the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  I use the 30-year bond yield as the proxy for the 
risk free rate.  The beta of each stock is the adjusted beta value obtained from Bloomberg.  It is 
measured over a one year range (February 10, 2001 to February 10, 2002) prior to the first event.  
Bloomberg performs a regression of the historical trading prices of the stock against the S&P 
500 using weekly data.   
Firm size is determined according to the market capitalization of the company.  The 
sample firms are divided into quintiles based on their market values.  The first quintile (type of 
firm=1) consists of firms with a market value of less than 0.026 billion, second quintile (type of 
firm=2) is firms with a market value under 0.73 billion, third quintile (type of firm=3) is firms 
with a market value below 4.03 billion, fourth quintile (type of firm=4) represents firms with less 
than a market value of 13.85 billion, and fifth quintile (type of firm=5) is the remaining firms 
that have a market value over 13.85 billion.   
An alternative way of grouping by firm size is according to the market value of the firm 
and the median market capitalization of the NYSE.  If the market capitalization of the company 
is above the median market capitalization on the NYSE (2.1 billion), it is classified as a large 
firm.  If the value of the company is below 2.1 billion, the company is classified as a small firm.   
The initial sample has 26,415 observations of stock returns that are aggregated by firms.  
This sample is filtered using the standard methods in the microstructure literature (Huang and 
Stoll 1996).  The following data filters are applied: 
i. Delete company if the market value is negative; 
ii. Delete company if it is out of time sequence (i.e. data available only during a part 
of the sample period), or involves an error; 
iii. Delete unlisted firms and other firms that are missing in Bloomberg or Finance  
Yahoo! on any event date.  This is done so in order to obtain reliable value of the 
adjusted beta.    
The trimming process decreases the observations by 7.11%, resulting in a final sample of 
24,660 observations for 548 firms in 58 industries.  In order to check for robustness, I also 
conduct the analysis without applying the filters (with the exception of filter ii) and find no 
significant difference in results.   
Empirical Methods 
This study focuses on the differential effect of the pre-SOX announcements on firm sizes 
through conducting an event study as discussed in Brown and Warner (1984), Romano and 
Bhagat (2001), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2005).   
One approach to assess the effect of a policy is to observe how the market reacts to the 
announcements that signal the passage of an act.  Through observing market responses to events 
that signal the passage of SOX, the abnormal return of small versus large firms is calculated to 
determine the impact of the Act.  Assuming the stock market is efficient, stock price reflects any 
publicly available information.  Therefore, it should change immediately to an extent that 
investors cannot earn abnormal profits by trading on information after its release.  As a result, the 
announcement effect on stock prices can be a simple but noisy indicator that illustrates how 
people perceive the effects of a new policy.  The event study methodology that this study 
employs has four components: 1) defining the event and announcement days; 2) measuring the 
stock returns during the announcement period; 3) estimating the expected return of the stock 
during this announcement period in the absence of the announcement; 4) computing the 
abnormal return and measuring its statistical and economic significance (Romano 2001).    
SOX is applicable to all publicly traded companies.  It is, therefore, expected that the 
stock market would react positively or negatively to the legislative events leading to the passage 
of SOX.  The test initially focuses on the market as a whole, which is represented by the 
randomly selected firms in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.  After determining the overall 
SOX-related announcement effect on firms, the test shifts its focus to detect any differential firm 
size effect due to the events leading to SOX’s enactment.  The test period for the fifteen events is 
from February to August 2002.  For each randomly selected firm, the abnormal returns (AR) 
around the event days are computed using the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  AR is defined as the 
difference between the actual return and the expected return.  Consistent with Rezaee and Jain 
(2005), I examine the average impact of the fifteen legislative events on stock returns and 
abnormal returns.  In calculating the expected returns for all relevant events, the CAPM model as 
shown below is used: 
Rit = Rf + ßi * (Rmt - Rf) 
Rit is the computed expected return; 
Rf is the risk-free rate that uses the 30-year bond yield as the proxy; 
Rm is defined as the market return of the S&P 500; 
ßi is the adjusted beta of firm i estimated from Bloomberg, using one year of data.   
Other return models are also used in conducting event studies, but this study uses the 
CAPM because it is a classic approach that is widely discussed in other event study papers (i.e. 
Jain and Rezaee 2005, and Gelband 2005) and the information required for this model is readily 
available.  (For a detailed list of other return models, please refer to Appendix III.)  Among other 
models, the Fama-French three factor model is often considered to be superior to the CAPM in 
event studies as it incorporates additional variables to give a better r-squared.  In simple terms, 
the Fama-French model is a regression analysis that separates out the systematic risk of a stock 
from the unsystematic risk by compensating for three factors. The first factor is a financial ratio 
called book to market, the second factor is the firm size based on its market capitalization, and 
the third factor is the return on the market portfolio.  However, critics claim that this model is 
problematic as it does not explain why the size of a company or the firm’s book-to-market ratio 
is a proper indicator of risk.  Lam (2005) compares the performance of the Fama-French model 
with the CAPM and finds no significant evidence suggesting that the Fama-French model is 
better than the CAPM.   
After computing the abnormal return of each event based on the CAPM, I perform 
multiple empirical tests using seven fundamental regression models to test my first and second 
hypotheses.  These regressions are estimated over the 1 to 45 trading days of stock return data 
between February and August 2002 using the actual returns of firms.  The number of trading 
days that the regressions are estimated over depends on the type of event.  Below is the list of the 
regression models: 
Regressions with stock return as the dependent variable 
Ri = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Type of firm + b3*Type of firm*Event day + ei (1) 
Ri = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Type of firm2 + b3*Type of firm2*Event day + ei (2) 
Ri = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Market value + b3*Market value*Event day + ei (3) 
Ri = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Market value + b3*Market value*Event day +  
b2*Market value2 + b3*Market value2*Event day + ei  (4) 
Regressions with stock abnormal return as the dependent variable 
ARi = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Type of firm + b3*Type of firm*Event day + ei (5) 
ARi = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Type of firm2 + b3*Type of firm2*Event day + ei (6) 
ARi = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Market value + b3*Market value*Event day + ei (7) 
ARi = α + Market return + b1*Event day + b2*Market value + b3*Market value*Event day +  
b2*Market value2 + b3*Market value2*Event day + ei  (8) 
Market return is defined in the “Sample Selection” section.  Event day is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 when there is an event leading to the passage of SOX, and equal to 0 when there is no SOX-
related event.  As noted earlier, there are two methods to group firms according to their firm size 
based on market values.  In the “Type of firm” regressions – regressions (1) and (5) – sample 
firms are divided into five groups with type of firm equal to 1 being the quintile with smallest 
firms and type of firm equal to 5 being the quintile with largest firms.  Similarly, in the “Type of 
firm2” regressions – regressions (2) and (6) – sample firms are divided into two groups with type 
of firm equal to 0 being the small firms and type of firm equal to 1 being the large firms.  Market 
value2 is the squared term of a firm’s market value.  It is included in the regression to capture 
possible non-linear effects.  There are also multiple interaction terms in the regression models 
(i.e. Market value*Event day) that capture the effect of firm size on stock returns or abnormal 
returns during event days.  For descriptive statistics of each variable, please refer to Table 1 in 
the Appendix.   
 The above regressions are also estimated for the five event classifications: 1) the passing 
of bills in the House; 2) the passing of bills in the Senate; 3) when the President signs the bill 
into law; 4) when the bills are first introduced in the House, the Senate, or the committee; and 5) 
when the bills are first introduced in the committee.  The same regression models listed above 
are used with the exception of the difference in the Event day variable.  For any events pertaining 
to the passing of bills in the House, Event day1 is used (instead of Event day).  For the events 
related to the passing of bills in the Senate, Event day2 is used.  Similarly, Event day3 is used 
when the President signs the bill into law, Event day4 represents when the bills are first 
introduced in the House, the Senate, or the committee, and Event day5 corresponds to when the 
bills are first introduced into the committee.   
 To test my third hypothesis, I examine the industry opacity effect on stock returns and 
abnormal returns during event period.  Four additional variables and interaction terms are added 
to Regressions (1) through (8) to examine SOX’s effect on the returns of firms in more opaque 
industries, such as depository institutions and insurance carriers.  For each regression listed 
above, the variables Industry1 and Industry2, and the interaction terms Industry1*Event day and 
Industry2*Event day are added in addition to the original regression.  Industry1 represents firms 
that belong to the depository institutions industry.  Industry2 represents firms that belong to the 
insurance carrier industry.  The industry effect also tests each of the five event classifications as 
described above.   
To account for possible heteroscedasticity in the error structure, I run the regressions 
using both Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Generalized Least Square (GLS) methods.  
Heteroscedasticity exists when the variance of the residual term varies with the independent 
variable.  This problem is usually found in cross-sectional data (i.e. when dealing with multiple 
members of a population at a given point in time, and these members may be of different sizes).  
With heteroscedasticity, estimators are unbiased and linear, but they are not best (i.e. they do not 
have the smallest variance).  Since OLS requires its estimators to be BLUE (best, linear, and 
unbiased), in the presence of heteroscedasticity, OLS estimators are not efficient.  On the other 
hand, GLS corrects for heteroscedasticity by taking into account the expected variance and 
covariance of the error terms.  Consistent with Burgio-Ficca (2004), GLS is recommended when 
heteroscedasticity exists and when the residuals are contemporaneously uncorrelated. 
V. RESULTS 
This section discusses empirical tests of the overall and differential effects of the events 
leading to the passage of SOX on market reactions.  Stock returns and the abnormal returns 
around SOX events are examined to test the hypotheses.  I also examine different market 
reactions toward events that are related to the signing of bills by the President, the passing of 
bills in the House or Senate, or the introduction of bills in the House, Senate, or the committee.  
Lastly, I discuss the relation between the opacity of an industry and stock returns and abnormal 
returns of those firms.  The robustness of the tests and alternative explanation are discussed at the 
end of this section.   
Overall and Differential Effect of SOX Events 
Tables 3 and 4 present results of stock return analyses of the overall firms’ and the 
different sizes of firms’ reactions to the legislative events leading to the passage of SOX.  The 
regressions performed in ordinary least squares or generalized least squares are largely consistent, 
with the exception of the significance of the Event day variable and the interaction term of 
Market Value * Event day in Specifications (3) and (7), the Event day1 variable in Specification 
(4), and the interaction term Type of firm * Event day4 in Table 4 (Stock Abnormal Returns).  
There are also slight discrepancies in some variables between OLS and GLS in Table 6 (Stocks 
Abnormal Return with Industry).  These variables are not significant at the 10 percent level when 
tested under OLS but they are significant at the 10 percent level when tested under GLS.  This is 
likely due to heteroscedasticity that causes a biased result in OLS; hence, the significance level is 
lower.  Figure 1 is a visual examination of residuals that suggests heteroscedasticity is very likely 
in Specifications (3) and (7) in the Event day table of Table 4.  The consistency across other 
results, nonetheless, suggests that heteroscedasticity is not likely to occur in other specifications.   
According to empirical results presented in Tables 3 and 4, there is a negative effect on 
stock returns and abnormal returns when it is an event day.  This negative effect decreases as 
firm size increases.  The negative coefficients for the Event day dummy variable are consistent 
and significant at a 5 or 10 percent level for all specifications.  This strongly suggests that being 
an event day (d=1) has a significantly negative impact on returns and abnormal returns.  These 
results support my hypothesis that as SOX has a negative impact on publicly traded firms; 
therefore, the market reacts negatively to events leading to SOX’s enactment.  This effect 
decreases as firm size increases, which suggests that the market perceives small firms to be more 
negatively impacted by SOX.  The inverse relation between the negative effect due to the event 
and firm size supports my hypothesis that SOX has a disproportionately negative impact on 
small firms.   
The testing of Market value and Market value squared in each of the tables suggests that 
non-linearity exists for some specifications.  For instance, some variables are not significant or 
less significant in Specifications (3) and (7), but they are significant or more significant in 
Specifications (4) and (8).  This is shown in the Event day table in Table 3.   
When I look specifically into how the market reacts to events related to the passing of 
bills in the House, I find that the market reacts negatively to those events.  There is no significant 
differential effect due to firm size.   Looking at Specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8) on Event day1 
in Tables 3 and 4, the Event day1 dummy variable is negative at the 5 percent level across these 
specifications.  As these events signal the likelihood of SOX’s enactment, the negative 
coefficients suggest that the market perceives SOX to have a negative value on firms.  This is 
consistent with the finding above, which suggests that when all fifteen legislative events are 
examined together, there is a negative effect of a SOX-related event on returns and abnormal 
returns.   
The market behaves similarly to the events related to the passing of bills in the Senate as 
to events related to the passing of bills in the House.  Event day2 identifies event days when 
there are bills passing in the Senate that increase the likelihood of SOX’s enactment.  As Tables 3 
and 4 illustrate, the negative coefficients of the Event day2 dummy variable are significant at the 
5 percent level.  While the interaction term of Market Value * Event day2 is positive for 
Specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8), it is not significant.  This suggests that events related to the 
passing of bills in the Senate have a negative overall effect on stock returns and abnormal returns, 
but that effect is unrelated to firm size.   
Although the passing of bills in the House or the Senate has a negative impact on market 
reaction, the market reacts positively when President Bush signs the bill into law.  Event day3 
represents the event day when he signed the bill into law.  I find that the market reacts positively 
to this event, and that effect increases as firm size increases.  In other words, while there is an 
overall positive effect due to this event, larger firms react more positively.  This may be 
explained by the fact that when President Bush signed the bills into law, the market is relieved as 
there would be no further changes in the near future that would strengthen the Act.  The result 
that large firms react more positively to the event supports my hypothesis that small firms have a 
more negative (or less positive) response to the events leading to the passage of SOX.   
For Event day4, results suggest that the event has a negative effect on the overall market 
and that effect decreases as the market value of the firm (firm size) increases.  Event day4 
represents the events when the bills are introduced in the House, Senate, or committee.  There 
results are consistent in Specifications (3), (4), (7), and (8) in Tables 3 and 4.  The negative 
coefficients of the dummy variable Event day4 are significant at the 5 percent level for all those 
specifications.  This suggests that these events have a negative impact on returns and abnormal 
returns, which supports my hypothesis that SOX has a negative impact on publicly traded 
companies.  If the market perceives that SOX has a negative impact on publicly traded 
companies, then the market is likely to react negatively to events that signal the enactment of the 
Act.  The positive coefficients of the interaction term Market Value * Event day4 are significant 
at the 5 percent level, which suggests that the negative effect decreases as firm size increases.  
This is as predicted, because prior research shows that SOX has a disproportionately negative 
impact on small firms.   
Event day5 is very similar to Event day3.  The positive coefficients of Event day5 are 
significant across all specifications, which suggests that the market in general has a positive 
perception of the introduction of bills in the committee.  Furthermore, the positive interaction 
term suggests that this positive effect is greater as firm size increases.  One possible explanation 
for this behavior is that market may prefer some (but not too stringent) government regulation on 
corporate governance.  As shown in Table 2 (Event Descriptions), there are often subsequent 
changes to the bill that impose more restrictions after its introduction in the committee.  
Therefore, it is likely that when bills are first introduced in committee, the market reacts 
positively as the initial bills would improve the reliability of information without imposing too 
much cost.  However, as the bills are made more stringent, the costs outweigh the benefits, which 
explains why the market reacts negatively when bills are later introduced and passed in the 
House or Senate.  This finding supports my hypothesis, because although there is an overall 
positive effect due to the event, the differential effect of firm size is also positive for larger firms.  
In other words, small firms have a less positive effect due to the event.  They are, thus, 
disproportionately harmed by the events leading to the passage of SOX.   
Relation Between Opaque Industries and Stock Returns and Abnormal Returns on Event 
Days 
I also investigated the relation between industry opacity and market reaction to event 
days.  As illustrated in Table 5, no significant finding can be drawn from the empirical test of the 
relation between industry transparency and stock returns.  The only significant result in Table 5 is 
the interaction term of Industry2 * Event day2.  Recall that Industry 2 is a dummy variable 
representing the insurance carriers industry, while Event day2 is a dummy variable 
corresponding to the events related to the passing of bills in the Senate.  The negative coefficient 
of the interaction term that is significant at a 5 or 10 percent level suggests that the event has a 
more negative (or less positive effect) on firms in the insurance carriers industry on event days.  
This finding does not support my hypothesis that SOX has a positive impact on opaque 
industries and so events leading to the passage of SOX should have a more positive or less 
negative effect on stock returns.   
Table 6 suggests that firms belonging to those opaque industries have a positive effect on 
stock abnormal returns.  However, that effect is lessened on event days.  In other words, events 
leading to the passage of SOX do not positively impact firms in the opaque industries.  These 
events instead impose a negative effect on these firms.  Results, however, are not consistent 
across the specifications.  As illustrated in Tables 5 and 6, these results do not support my 
hypothesis.  Ang et al.’s (2001) findings suggest that transparency of individual firms has an 
effect on the firm’s stocks returns, but transparency of the industry that the sample companies 
belong to does not have significant effect on those firms’ stocks returns.  This may explain why 
some results are marginally significant, and results are generally inconsistent.   
Robustness and Alternative Explanation 
Although the Fama-French model, a refined model that is used in event studies which 
may lead to more solid findings, is not used in this study, the consistency of the results across 
different specifications and returns suggests that results are robust.   
I also estimate regression using alternative definitions of firm size.  In addition to 
performing the regressions on market values to capture the firm size effect, I also performed the 
regressions on the different types of firm.  Type of firm is a discrete variable ranging from 1 to 5, 
with 1 being the quintile of the smallest market values of the sample firms (that is, the smallest 
110 firms) and 5 being the quintile of the largest market values (the largest 110 firms).  Type of 
firm2 is a dummy variable, where 0=small firm and 1=large firm.  The results are largely 
consistent, except that regressions using Type of firm or Type of firm2 have different signs for the 
coefficients of some variables than regressions using Market Value.  Nonetheless, discrepancies 
only exist for coefficients that are not significant at the 5 or 10 percent level.  In other words, the 
results generated from the regressions using Type of firm, Type of firm2, or Market Value are 
consistent across all significant coefficients.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This research investigates the overall and differential effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on 
firms with different sizes through a study of market reactions around the legislative events 
leading to the passage of SOX.  Although SOX claims to prevent deceptive accounting and 
management misbehavior, it simultaneously imposes high compliance costs onto U.S. publicly 
traded companies, and the small firms in particular.  I find that the stock returns and abnormal 
returns around the legislative events are significantly negative, and the negative effect decreases 
as firm size increases.  I also find that when I examine the effect of SOX under the five event 
classification, the market in general reacts negatively to the events, with the exception of the 
events pertaining to the signing of the bill into law and the introduction of bills in the committee.  
In these two types of events, the market reacts positively, but small firms experience a smaller 
positive effect as consistent with my hypothesis.  The evidence reveals that investors may prefer 
government regulation in the midst of accounting scandals, but they consider a stringent act, such 
as SOX, to be costly.  Therefore, they perceive that the information that signals the likelihood of 
the passage of SOX to be bad news for companies.   
 I further investigate the relation between SOX-related events and industry opacity.  I find 
no consistent result that suggests events leading to SOX’s enactment have a positive impact on 
firms that belong to a more opaque industry.  On the contrary, the small amount of results that 
are significant suggest that the events leading to the passage of SOX have a more negative or less 
positive effect on the companies that belong to the depository institutions or the insurance 
carriers industries.  In another words, firms in no particular industry would be harmed by the 
events leading to the passage of SOX.   
 Even though the selection of events in this study is leveraged on previous research, one 
possible extension of this study is to further examine other important, but not associated with 
significant market reactions, business news around SOX-related events that could affect 
industries or specific sectors of the economy.  This could help explain insignificant results or 
results that do not support the hypotheses.   
 The study could also be extended further by examining the political issues surrounding 
the passage of the Act.  Despite the fact that SOX is claimed to combat the corrupted corporate 
governance, the real purpose of the Act is often questioned.  Some scholars even believe that the 
swift passage of SOX is a political product due to the tensions from the congressional election of 
November 2002 (Zhang 2005).  If the passage of SOX is due to political reason rather than its 
claimed benefits, the costs of SOX would unsurprisingly outweigh the benefits and create a 
substantial compliance burden to U.S. publicly traded firms.  This explains why investigating the 
political issues around SOX would help examining the economic consequences on all publicly 
traded firms, and the disproportionate negative effect that SOX imposes on small firms.   
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Table 1 – Statistical Descriptive of Variables and Interaction Terms 
 





RETURN: actual daily return of sample securities -0.51 2.19 0.00 0.05 24660
ABNORMAL RETURN: difference between the 
expected and actual return -0.66 1.97 -0.11 0.05 24660
MARKET RETURN: market return of the S&P 500 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.00 24660
EVENT DAY: dummy variable of the fifteen events 
with 1=event and 0=no event 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.49 24660
EVENT DAY1: dummy variable of events related to 
passing bills in the House 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.21 24660
EVENT DAY2: dummy variable of events related to 
passing bills in the Senate 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.21 24660
EVENT DAY3: dummy variable of events related to 
signing of bill into law  0.00 1.00 0.04 0.21 24660
EVENT DAY4: dummy variable of events related to 
introducing bills in the House, the Senate, and the 
committee 
0.00 1.00 0.13 0.34 24660
EVENT DAY5: dummy variable of events related to 
introducing bills in the committee 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.21 24660
TYPE OF FIRM: five firm size groups with 
1=quintile of smallest firms to 5=quintile of 
largest firms 
1.00 5.00 3.00 1.41 24660
TYPE OF FIRM * EVENT DAY: interaction term that 
suggests possible differential effect 0.00 5.00 1.73 1.83 24660
TYPE OF FIRM * EVENT DAY1: interaction term 0.00 5.00 0.13 0.69 24660
TYPE OF FIRM * EVENT DAY2: interaction term 0.00 5.00 0.13 0.69 24660
TYPE OF FIRM * EVENT DAY3: interaction term 0.00 5.00 0.13 0.69 24660
TYPE OF FIRM * EVENT DAY4: interaction term 0.00 5.00 0.40 1.14 24660
TYPE OF FIRM * EVENT DAY5: interaction term 0.00 5.00 0.13 0.69 24660
TYPE OF FIRM2: two firm size group with 0=small 
firms and 1=large firms 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.50 24660
TYPE OF FIRM2 * EVENT DAY: interaction term 
that suggests possible differential effect 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.46 24660
TYPE OF FIRM2 * EVENT DAY1: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.15 24660
TYPE OF FIRM2 * EVENT DAY2: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.15 24660
TYPE OF FIRM2 * EVENT DAY3: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.15 24660
TYPE OF FIRM2 * EVENT DAY4: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26 24660
TYPE OF FIRM2 * EVENT DAY5: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.15 24660
MARKET VALUE: market capitalization of firm; 
used to determine firm size 0.00 442.92 12.20 35.32 24660
MARKET VALUE * EVENT DAY: interaction term 
that suggests possible differential effect 0.00 442.92 7.05 27.52 24660
MARKET VALUE * EVENT DAY1: interaction term 0.00 442.92 0.54 7.86 24660
MARKET VALUE * EVENT DAY2: interaction term 0.00 442.92 0.54 7.86 24660
MARKET VALUE * EVENT DAY3: interaction term 0.00 442.92 0.54 7.86 24660
MARKET VALUE * EVENT DAY4: interaction term 0.00 442.92 1.63 13.55 24660
MARKET VALUE * EVENT DAY5: interaction term 0.00 442.92 0.54 7.86 24660
MARKET VALUE2: the squared term of market 
value 0.00 196180.90 1396.59 11541.90 24660
MARKET VALUE2 * EVENT DAY: interaction term 
that suggests possible differential effect 0.00 196180.90 806.92 8800.27 24660
MARKET VALUE2 * EVENT DAY1: interaction term 0.00 196180.90 62.07 2450.21 24660
MARKET VALUE2 * EVENT DAY2: interaction term 0.00 196180.90 62.07 2450.21 24660
MARKET VALUE2 * EVENT DAY3: interaction term 0.00 196180.90 62.07 2450.21 24660
MARKET VALUE2 * EVENT DAY4: interaction term 0.00 196180.90 186.21 4241.16 24660
MARKET VALUE2 * EVENT DAY5: interaction term 0.00 196180.90 62.07 2450.21 24660
INDUSTRY1: insurance carriers 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 24660
INDUSTRY1 * EVENT DAY: interaction term that 
suggests possible differential effect 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16 24660
INDUSTRY1 * EVENT DAY1: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 24660
INDUSTRY1 * EVENT DAY2: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 24660
INDUSTRY1 * EVENT DAY3: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 24660
INDUSTRY1 * EVENT DAY4: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.08 24660
INDUSTRY1 * EVENT DAY5: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04 24660
INDUSTRY2: depository institutions 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29 24660
INDUSTRY2 * EVENT DAY: interaction term that 
suggests possible differential effect 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 24660
INDUSTRY2 * EVENT DAY1: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 24660
INDUSTRY2 * EVENT DAY2: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 24660
INDUSTRY2 * EVENT DAY3: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 24660
INDUSTRY2 * EVENT DAY4: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.11 24660
INDUSTRY2 * EVENT DAY5: interaction term 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.06 24660




(bolded = event 
days) Descriptions of Events 
20020211 





20020214   
20020227 
House Democrats introduced legislation that would impose more 
restrictions than Oxley’s proposal 
20020228  
E2: 2/27-3/1 
20020301   
20020306 Bush’s first response to accounting scandals unveiled 
20020307  E3: 3/6-3/8 
20020308   
20020325 Greenspan warned against too much regulation 
20020326  E4: 3/25-3/27 
20020327   
20020411 
House Financial Services Committee scheduled to vote Oxley’s bill, but 
the vote was postponed E5: 4/11-4/12 
20020412   
20020416 Oxley’s bill passed in the Committee E6: 4/16-4/17 
20020417   
20020424 Oxley’s bill passed in the House 
20020425 
Senate Judiciary Committee approved legislation bolstering corporate 
fraud laws E7: 4/24-4/26 
20020426   
20020507 Sarbanes circulated his reform bill in the Senate Banking Committee 
20020508  E8: 5/7-5/9 
20020509   
20020610 Democrats in Senate Banking Committee united behind Sarbanes’ bill 
20020611 
Mark-up of Sarbanes bill to occur: SEC proposed rules to require 
executives to certify financial reports 
20020612  
E9: 6/10-6/13 
20020613   
20020625 Introduction of S. 2673 in Senate. 
20020626 WorldCom fraud announcement. E10: 6/25-6/27 
20020627 
S.E.C. files suit against WorldCom and require CEO/CFO certifications.
   
  
Event Window 
(bolded = event 
days) Descriptions of Events 
20020708 Senate considers S. 2673 
20020709 Bush makes speech on Wall Street. 
20020710 Senate passes amendment to strengthen criminal penalties. 
20020711  
E11: 7/8-7/12 
20020712   
20020715 Senate passes S. 2673. 
20020716 Introduction of H.R. 5118 
20020717 Passage of H.R. 5118. 
E12: 7/15-7/17 
  Bush wants bill before August break. 
20020724 Issuance of Conference Report 
20020725 House and Senate pass Conference Report. E13: 7/24-7/26 
20020726 Bush reportedly will sign bill. 
20020729 
S.E.C. to post names of CEOs/CFOs who fail to certify their companies’ 
financial reports. E14: 7/29-7/30 
20020730 President signs bill into law. 
20020814 CEO/CFO certifications due at the S.E.C.  E15: 8/14-8/15 
20020815   
 
Table 3 – Empirical Results of Stocks Returns 
 
Return - Event day  OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
 (6.32) (6.31) (6.30) (6.30) (6.32) (6.31) (6.30) (6.30)
Market return -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17
 (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)**
Event day -0.0044 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0044 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0015
 (-3.15)** (-2.56)** (-1.88)* (-2.20)** (-3.15)** (-2.56)** (-1.88)* (-2.20)**
Type of firm -0.00011 - - - -0.00011 - - -
 (-0.34) - - - (-0.34) - - -
Type of firm * Event day 0.0012 - - - 0.0012 - - -
 (2.83)** - - - (2.83)** - - -
Type of firm2 - -2.45E-05 - - - -2.45E-05 - -
 - (-0.03) - - - (-0.03) - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - 0.0026 - - - 0.0026 - -
 - (2.23)** - - - (2.23)** - -
Market value - - 4.17E-06 5.24E-06 - - 4.17E-06 5.24E-06
 - - (0.33) (0.19) - - (0.33) (0.19)
Market value * Event day - - 0.000030 0.000071 - - 0.000030 0.000071
 - - (1.81)* (1.98)** - - (1.81)* (1.98)**
Market value sq. - - - -3.68E-09 - - - -3.68E-09
 - - - (-0.04) - - - (-0.04)
Market value sq. * Event day - - - -1.40E-07 - - - -1.40E-07
  - - - (-1.29)  - - - (-1.29)
Goodness-of-fit: - - - -  
F value 13.70 12.64 12.28 8.88 - - - -
Root MSE 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0021 0.0019 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 Return - Event day1 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
 (5.29) (5.34) (5.37) (5.36) (5.29) (5.34) (5.37) (5.36)
Market return -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96
 (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)**
Event day1 -0.00019 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0032 -0.00019 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0032
 (-0.06) (-1.52) (-2.57)** (-2.00)** (-0.06) (-1.52) (-2.57)** (-2.00)**
Type of firm 0.00064 - - - 0.00064 - - -
 (3.03)** - - - (3.03)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day1 -0.0014 - - - -0.0014 - - -
 (-1.42) - - - (-1.42) - - -
Type of firm2 - 0.0016 - - - 0.0016 - -
 - (2.68)** - - - (2.68)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -0.0023 - - - -0.0023 - -
 - (-0.82) - - - (-0.82) - -
Market value - - 0.000023 0.000052 - - 0.000023 0.000052
 - - (2.79)** (2.88)** - - (2.79)** (2.88)**
Market value * Event day1 - - 0.000042 -0.00013 - - 0.000042 -0.00013
 - - (-1.07) (-1.56) - - (-1.07) (-1.56)
Market value sq. - - - -9.88E-08 - - - -9.88E-08
 - - - (-1.79)* - - - (-1.79)*
Market value sq. * Event day1 - - - 3.13E-07 - - - 3.13E-07
 - - - (1.20) - - - (1.20)
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 14.08 13.44 13.63 9.74 - - - -
Root MSE 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 0.0021 0.0020 0.0019 0.0020 0.0020
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 Return - Event day2 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
 (6.85) (6.90) (6.93) (6.92) (6.85) (6.90) (6.93) (6.92)
Market return -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23
 (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)**
Event day2 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0075 -0.0082 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0075 -0.0082
 (-1.60) (-2.51)** (-4.99)** (-5.11)** (-1.60) (-2.51)** (-4.99)** (-5.11)**
Type of firm 0.00060 - - - 0.00060 - - -
 (2.85)** - - - (2.85)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day2 -0.00057 - - - -0.00057 - - -
 (-0.58) - - - (-0.58) - - -
Type of firm2 - 0.0016 - - - 0.0016 - -
 - (2.76)** - - - (2.76)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -0.0033 - - - -0.0033 - -
 - (-1.17) - - - (-1.17) - -
Market value - - 0.000020 0.000040 - - 0.000020 0.000040
 - - (2.35)** (2.22)** - - (2.35)** (2.22)**
Market value * Event day2 - - 0.000040 0.00014 - - 0.000040 0.00014
 - - (1.02) (1.58) - - (1.02) (1.58)
Market value sq. - - - -7.03E-08 - - - -7.03E-08
 - - - (-1.27) - - - (-1.27)
Market value sq. * Event day2 - - - -3.28E-07 - - - -3.28E-07
 - - - (-1.25) - - - (-1.25)
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 17.38 17.34 17.32 12.22 - - - -
Root MSE 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0027 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 Return - Event day3 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062
 (3.03) (3.05) (3.06) (3.05) (3.03) (3.05) (3.06) (3.05)
Market return -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54
 (-3.02)** (-3.02)** (-3.01)** (-3.02)** (-3.02)** (-3.02)** (-3.01)** (-3.02)**
Event day3 0.0041 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.0041 0.018 0.025 0.023
 (1.24) (8.63)** (16.69)** (14.46)** (1.24) (8.63)** (16.69)** (14.46)**
Type of firm 0.00025 - - - 0.00025 - - -
 (1.18) - - - (1.18) - - -
Type of firm * Event day3 0.0074 - - - 0.0074 - - -
 (7.44)** - - - (7.44)** - - -
Type of firm2 - 0.00081 - - - 0.00081 - -
 - (1.38) - - - (1.38) - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - 0.015 - - - 0.015 - -
 - (5.46)** - - - (5.46)** - -
Market value - - 0.000017 0.000030 - - 0.000017 0.000030
 - - (2.06)** (1.69)* - - (2.06)** (1.69)*
Market value * Event day3 - - 0.000097 0.00036 - - 0.000097 0.00036
 - - (2.45)** (4.19)** - - (2.45)** (4.19)**
Market value sq. - - - -4.51E-08 - - - -4.51E-08
 - - - (-0.82) - - - (-0.82)
Market value sq. * Event day3 - - - -8.95E-07 - - - -8.95E-07
 - - - (-3.44)** - - - (-3.44)**
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 110.70 103.9 97.92 67.71 - - - -
Root MSE 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 Return - Event day4 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.13 .13 .13 .13  0.13 .13 .13 .13
 (6.30) (6.34) (6.36) (6.36) (6.30) (6.34) (6.36) (6.36)
Market return -1.12 -1.11 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.11 -1.12 -1.12
 (-6.25)** (-6.24)** (-6.25)** (-6.25)** (-6.25)** (-6.24)** (-6.25)** (-6.25)**
Event day4 -0.0056 -.0033 -.0030 -.0035 -0.0056 -.0033 -.0030 -.0035
 (-2.78)** (-2.62)** (-3.32)** (-3.62)** (-2.78)** (-2.62)** (-3.32)** (-3.62)**
Type of firm 0.00041 - - - 0.00041 - - -
 (1.88)* - - - (1.88)* - - -
Type of firm * Event day4 0.0012 - - - 0.0012 - - -
 (1.97)** - - - (1.97)** - - -
Type of firm2 - .0012 - - - .0012 - -
 - (1.88)* - - - (1.88)* - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - .0024 - - - .0024 - -
 - (1.39) - - - (1.39) - -
Market value - - .000011 .000026 - - .000011 .000026
 - - (1.21) (1.39) - - (1.21) (1.39)
Market value * Event day4 - - .000082 .00015 - - .000082 .00015
 - - (3.38)** (2.84)** - - (3.38)** (2.84)**
Market value sq. - - - -5.45e-08 - - - -5.45e-08
 - - - (-0.94) - - - (-0.94)
Market value sq. * Event day4 - - - -2.28e-07 - - - -2.28e-07
 - - - (-1.44) - - - (-1.44)
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 13.57 12.78 15.23 10.91 - - - -
Root MSE 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0020 0.0021 0.0023 0.0024 0.0019 0.0018 0.0022 0.0023
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 Return - Event day5 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.13 .13 0.13 0.13  0.13 .13 0.13 0.13
 (6.30) (6.32) (6.35) (6.34) (6.30) (6.32) (6.35) (6.34)
Market return -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12
 (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)**
Event day5 -0.0043 0.0092 0.012 0.0093 -0.0043 0.0092 0.012 0.0093
 (-1.31) (4.43)** (7.84)** (5.84)** (-1.31) (4.43)** (7.84)** (5.84)**
Type of firm 0.00029 - - - 0.00029 - - -
 (1.37) - - - (1.37) - - -
Type of firm * Event day5 0.0064 - - - 0.0064 - - -
 (6.49)** - - - (6.49)** - - -
Type of firm2 - 0.001 - - - 0.001 - -
 - (1.71)* - - - (1.71)* - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - 0.011 - - - 0.011 - -
 - (3.85)** - - - (3.85)** - -
Market value - - 9.18E-06 0.000019 - - 9.18E-06 0.000019
 - - (1.10) (1.08) - - (1.10) (1.08)
Market value * Event day5 - - 0.00028 0.00060 - - 0.00028 0.00060
 - - (6.99)** (7.03)** - - (6.99)** (7.03)**
Market value sq. - - - -3.54E-08 - - - -3.54E-08
 - - - (-0.64) - - - (-0.64)
Market value sq. * Event day5 - - - -1.11E-06 - - - -1.11E-06
  - - - (-4.27)**  - - - (-4.27)**
Goodness-of-fit:   
F value 50.50 43.31 51.94 38.10 - - - -
Root MSE 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0080 0.0068 0.0082 0.0092 0.0079 0.0068 0.0082 0.0089
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
Table 4 – Empirical Results of Stocks Abnormal Return 
 
AR – Event day OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14
 (7.30) (5.64) (5.55) (5.62) (7.30) (5.64) (6.58) (6.64)
Market return -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17
 (-11.46)** (-9.65)** (-9.66)** (-9.68)** (-11.46)** (-9.65)** (-11.46)** (-11.46)**
Event day -0.0044 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0044 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0015
 (-3.14)** (-2.151)** (-1.57) (-1.85)* (-3.14)** (-2.151)** (-1.87)* (-2.19)**
Type of firm -0.0063 - - - -0.0063 - - -
 (-6.83)** - - - (-6.83)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day 0.0012 - - - 0.0012 - - -
 (2.82)** - - - (2.82)** - - -
Type of firm2 - -0.0080 - - - -0.0080 - -
 - (-7.46)** - - - (-7.46)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - 0.0026 - - - 0.0026 - -
 - (1.87)* - - - (1.87)* - -
Market value - - -0.00014 -3.55E-04 - - -0.00014 -3.55E-04
 - - (-9.28)** (-11.00)** - - (-3.72)** (-4.42)**
Market value * Event day - - 0.000030 0.000071 - - 0.000030 0.000071
 - - (1.52) (1.66)* - - (1.80)* (1.97)**
Market value sq. - - - 7.44E-07 - - - 7.44E-07
 - - - (7.54)** - - - (3.03)**
Market value sq. * Event day - - - -1.40E-07 - - - -1.40E-07
 - - - (-1.08) - - - (-1.28)
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 158.60 46.81 64.09 60.91 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.025 0.0074 0.010 0.014 0.0060 0.0059 0.0058 0.0059
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
 AR – Event day1 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12
 (5.42) (4.84) (4.77) (4.84) (6.32) (5.73) (5.65) (5.71)
Market return -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96
 (-9.06)** (-8.98)** (-8.99)** (-9.01)** (-10.67)** (-10.67)** (-10.67)** (-10.67)**
Event day1 -0.00019 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0032 -0.00019 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0032
 (-0.05) (-1.27) (-2.16)** (-1.68)* (-0.06) (-1.51) (-2.56)** (-1.99)**
Type of firm -0.0055 - - - -0.0055 - - -
 (-22.25)** - - - (-6.23)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day1 -0.0014 - - - -0.0014 - - -
 (-1.20) - - - (-1.41) - - -
Type of firm2 - -0.0064 - - - -0.0064 - -
 - (-8.95)** - - - (2.46)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -0.0023 - - - -0.0023 - -
 - (-0.68) - - - (-0.81) - -
Market value - - -0.00012 -0.00031 - - -0.00012 -0.00031
 - - (-12.04)** (-14.37)** - - (-3.31)** (-3.97)**
Market value * Event day1 - - 0.000042 -0.00013 - - 0.000042 -0.00013
 - - (-0.89) (-1.31) - - (-1.06) (-1.55)
Market value sq. - - - 6.49E-07 - - - 6.49E-07
 - - - (9.89)** - - - (2.73)**
Market value sq. * Event day1 - - - 3.13E-07 - - - 3.13E-07
 - - - (1.01) - - - (1.19)
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 158.88 47.38 65.04 61.53 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.025 0.0075 0.010 0.015 0.0060 0.006 0.006 0.006
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
 AR – Event day2 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15
 (6.75) (6.15) (6.08) (6.15) (7.87) (7.28) (7.20) (7.27)
Market return -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23
 (-10.43)** (-10.34)** (-10.35)** (-10.38)** (-12.28)** (-12.29)** (-12.28)** (-12.29)**
Event day2 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0075 -0.0082 -0.0053 -0.0052 -0.0075 -0.0082
 (-1.35) (-2.10)** (-4.19)** (-4.30)** (-1.59) (-2.50)** (-4.97)** (-5.09)**
Type of firm -0.0056 - - - -0.0056 - - -
 (-22.40)** - - - (-6.27)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day2 -0.00057 - - - -0.00057 - - -
 (-0.49) - - - (-0.57) - - -
Type of firm2 - -0.0063 - - - -0.0063 - -
 - (-8.89)** - - - (-2.44)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -0.0033 - - - -0.0033 - -
 - (-0.98) - - - (-1.17) - -
Market value - - -0.00012 -0.00032 - - -0.00012 -0.00032
 - - (-12.41)** (-14.93)** - - (-3.42)** (-4.13)**
Market value * Event day2 - - 0.000040 0.00014 - - 0.000040 0.00014
 - - (0.85) (1.33) - - (1.01) (1.57)
Market value sq. - - - 6.78E-07 - - - 6.78E-07
 - - - (10.33)** - - - (2.85)**
Market value sq. * Event day2 - - - -3.28E-07 - - - -3.28E-07
 - - - (-1.05) - - - (-1.25)
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 161.28 50.12 67.66 63.30 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.025 0.0079 0.011 0.015 0.0066 0.0066 0.0066 0.0067
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
 AR – Event day3 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.085 0.071 0.069 0.070 0.085 0.071 0.069 0.070
 (3.53) (2.92) (2.83) (2.90) (4.12) (3.47) (3.36) (3.43)
Market return -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54
 (-7.24)** (-7.17)** (-7.18)** (-7.20)** (-8.55)** (-8.54)** (-8.54)** (-8.54)**
Event day3 0.0041 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.0041 0.018 0.025 0.023
 (1.05) (7.22)** (13.97)** (12.13)** (1.24) (8.59)** (16.61)** (14.39)**
Type of firm -0.0059 - - - -0.0059 - - -
 (-23.95)** - - - (-6.67)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day3 0.0074 - - - 0.0074 - - -
 (6.27)** - - - (7.41)** - - -
Type of firm2  -0.0071 - - -0.0071 - -
  (-10.10)** - - (-2.76)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day  0.015 - - 0.015 - -
  (4.57)** - - (5.44)** - -
Market value - - -0.00013 -0.00033 - - -0.00013 -0.00033
 - - (-12.72)** (-15.46)** - - (-3.49)** (-4.25)**
Market value * Event day3 - - 0.000097 0.00036 - - 0.000097 0.00036
 - - (2.05)** (3.51)** - - (2.44)** (4.17)**
Market value sq. - - - 7.03E-07 - - - 7.03E-07
 - - - (10.76)** - - - (2.96)**
Market value sq. * Event day3 - - - -8.95E-07 - - - -8.95E-07
 - - - (-2.89)** - - - (-3.43)**
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 229.19 110.93 124.62 102.84 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.036 0.018 0.020 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
 AR – Event day4 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.15 .14 .14 .14 0.15 .14 .14 .14
 (6.30) (5.68) (5.61) (5.68) (7.35) (6.73) (6.64) (6.71)
Market return -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12
 (-10.00)** (-9.91)** (-9.93)** (-9.95)** (-11.77)** (-11.77)** (-11.78)** (-11.78)**
Event day4 -0.0056 -.0033 -.0030 -.0035 -0.0056 -.0033 -.0030 -.0035
 (-2.35)** (-2.19)** (-2.79)** (-3.04)** (-2.77)** (-2.60)** (-3.31)** (-3.60)**
Type of firm -0.0057 - - - -0.0057 - - -
 (-22.03)** - - - (-6.46)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day4 0.0012 - - - 0.0012 - - -
 (1.66)* - - - (1.96) - - -
Type of firm2  -.0068 - - -.0068 - -
  (-9.08)** - - (-2.61)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day  .0024 - - .0024 - -
  (1.16) - - (1.38) - -
Market value - - -.00013 -.00033 - - -.00013 -.00033
 - - (-12.68)** (-14.82)** - - (-3.66)** (-4.29)**
Market value * Event day4 - - .000082 .00015 - - .000082 .00015
 - - (2.83)** (2.39)** - - (3.36)** (2.83)**
Market value sq. - - - 6.94E-07 - - - 6.94E-07
 - - - (10.06)** - - - (2.91)**
Market value sq. * Event day4 - - - -2.28E-07 - - - -2.28E-07
 - - - (-1.21) - - - (-1.43)
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 158.50 62.36 66.18 46.91 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.025 0.015 0.011 0.0074 0.0060 0.0059 0.0063 0.0064
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 AR – Event day5 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14  0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14
 (6.30) (5.67) (5.59) (5.67) (7.35) (6.71) (6.63) (6.70)
Market return -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12
 (-10.04)** (-9.95)** (-9.96)** (-9.99)** (-11.83)** (-11.82)** (-11.83)** (-11.84)**
Event day5 -0.0043 0.0092 0.012 0.0093 -0.0043 0.0092 0.012 0.0093
 (-1.11) (3.71)** (6.57)** (4.91)** (-1.31) (4.41)** (7.80)** (5.82)**
Type of firm -0.0059 - - - -0.0059 - - -
 (-23.70)** - - - (-6.62)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day5 0.0064 - - - 0.0064 - - -
 (5.48)** - - - (6.46)** - - -
Type of firm2  -0.0069 - - -0.0069 - -
  (-9.79)** - - (-2.68)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day  0.011 - - 0.011 - -
  (3.22)** - - (3.83)** - -
Market value - - -0.00013 -0.00034 - - -0.00013 -0.00034
 - - (-13.49)** (-15.93)** - - (-3.71)** (-4.39)**
Market value * Event day5 - - 0.00028 0.0006 - - 0.00028 0.00060
 - - (5.85)** (5.90)** - - (6.95)** (7.00)**
Market value sq. - - - 7.13E-07 - - - 7.13E-07
 - - - (10.88)** - - - (3.00)**
Market value sq. * Event day5 - - - -1.11E-06 - - - -1.11E-06
 - - - (-3.58)** - - - (-4.25)**
Goodness-of-fit:            
F value 185.45 68.42 92.18 81.78 - - - -
Root MSE 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.029 0.011 0.015 0.020 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
Table 5 – Empirical Results of Stock Returns In Relation to the Opaque Industries 
 
Return (Industry) – Event day  OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.14 .14 .14 .14 0.14 .14 .14 .14
 (6.32) (6.31) (6.30) (6.30) (6.32) (6.31) (6.30) (6.30)
Market return -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17 -1.17
 (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)** (-6.21)**
Event day -0.0046 -0.0023 -.0012 -.0015 -0.0046 -0.0023 -.0012 -.0015
 (-3.14)** (-2.49)** (-1.75)* (-2.09)** (-3.14)** (-2.49)** (-1.75)* (-2.09)**
Type of firm -0.00011 - - - -0.00011 - - -
 (-0.33) - - - (-0.33) - - -
Type of firm * Event day 0.0012 - - - 0.0012 - - -
 (2.89)** - - - (2.89)** - - -
Type of firm2 - -0.0000208 - - - -0.0000208 - -
 - (-0.02) - - - (-0.02) - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - 0.0027 - - - 0.0027 - -
 - (2.27)** - - - (2.27)** - -
Market value - - 4.25e-06 5.45e-06 - - 4.25e-06 5.45e-06
 - - (0.34) (0.20) - - (0.34) (0.20)
Market value * Event day - - .00003 .000071 - - .00003 .000071
 - - (1.80)* (1.98)** - - (1.80)* (1.98)**
Market value sq. - - - -4.12e-09 - - - -4.12e-09
 - - - (-0.05) - - - (-0.05)
Market value sq. * Event day - - - -1.41e-07 - - - -1.41e-07
 - - - (-1.29) - - - (-1.29)
Industry1: Depository Institutions 0.000083 0.0000632 .000091 .000094 0.000083 0.0000632 .000091 .000094
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry1 * Event day -0.00086 -0.001134 -.00037 -.00027 -0.00086 -0.001134 -.00037 -.00027
 (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.13) (-0.09) (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.13) (-0.09)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers -9.81E-06 0.0000814 .00012 .00012 -9.81E-06 0.0000814 .00012 .00012
 (-0.010) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (-0.010) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Industry2 * Event day 0.0010 0.0005191 .00018 .00033 0.0010 0.0005191 .00018 .00033
  (0.50) (0.25) (0.09) (0.16)  (0.50) (0.25) (0.09) (0.16)
Goodness-of-fit:          
F value 6.95 6.39 6.15 5.34 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0019 0.0017 0.0020 0.0022 0.0019 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
Return (Industry) – Event day1 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.11 .11 .11 .11 0.11 .11 .11 .11
 (5.29) (5.34) (5.37) (5.36) (5.29) (5.34) (5.37) (5.36)
Market return -0.96 -.96 -.96 -.96 -0.96 -.96 -.96 -.96
 (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)** (-5.26)**
Event day1 -0.0015 -.0042 -.0049 -.0043 -0.0015 -.0042 -.0049 -.0043
 (-0.43) (-1.90)* (-3.01)** (-2.45)** (-0.43) (-1.90)* (-3.01)** (-2.45)**
Type of firm 0.00065 - - - 0.00065 - - -
 (3.06)** - - - (3.06)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day1 -0.0013 - - - -0.0013 - - -
 (1.26) - - - (1.26) - - -
Type of firm2 - .0016 - - - .0016 - -
 - (2.73)** - - - (2.73)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -.0022 - - - -.0022 - -
 - (-0.78) - - - (-0.78) - -
Market value - - .000023 .000052 - - .000023 .000052
 - - (2.76)** (2.86)** - - (2.76)** (2.86)**
Market value * Event day1 - - -.000037 -.00012 - - -.000037 -.00012
 - - (-0.94) (-1.41) - - (-0.94) (-1.41)
Market value sq. - - - -9.86e-08 - - - -9.86e-08
 - - - (-1.78)* - - - (-1.78)*
Market value sq. * Event day1 - - - 2.89e-07 - - - 2.89e-07
 - - - (1.10) - - - (1.10)
Industry1: Depository Institutions -0.0084 -.0010 -.00052 -.00045 -0.0084 -.0010 -.00052 -.00045
 (-0.58) (-0.70) (-0.35) (-0.31) (-0.58) (-0.70) (-0.35) (-0.31)
Industry1 * Event day1 0.0094 .0096 .0089 .0087 0.0094 .0096 .0089 .0087
 (1.37) (1.39) (1.29) (1.26) (1.37) (1.39) (1.29) (1.26)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.0036 .00012 -.000046 .000058 0.0036 .00012 -.000046 .000058
 (0.34) (0.12) (-0.04) (0.06) (0.34) (0.12) (-0.04) (0.06)
Industry2 * Event day1 0.0052 .0059 .0061 .0057 0.0052 .0059 .0061 .0057
 (1.05) (1.19) (1.24) (1.17) (1.05) (1.19) (1.24) (1.17)
Goodness-of-fit:           
F value 7.45 7.16 7.19 6.13 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0021 0.0020 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.0018
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
Return (Industry) – Event day2 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.14 .14 .14 .14 0.14 .14 .14 .14
 (6.84) (6.89) (6.93) (6.92) (6.84) (6.89) (6.93) (6.92)
Market return -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23 -1.23
 (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)** (-6.82)**
Event day2 -0.0031 -.0038 -.0063 -.0070 -0.0031 -.0038 -.0063 -.0070
 (-0.90) (-1.72)* (-3.89)** (-4.04)** (-0.90) (-1.72)* (-3.89)** (-4.04)**
Type of firm 0.00064 - - - 0.00064 - - -
 (2.98)** - - - (2.98)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day2 -0.00089 - - - -0.00089 - - -
 (-0.88) - - - (-0.88) - - -
Type of firm2 - .0017 - - - .0017 - -
 - (2.84)** - - - (2.84)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -.0037 - - - -.0037 - -
 - (-1.31) - - - (-1.31) - -
Market value - - .000020 .000041 - - .000020 .000041
 - - (2.38)** (2.27)** - - (2.38)** (2.27)**
Market value * Event day2 - - .000034 .00012 - - .000034 .00012
 - - (0.86) (1.40) - - (0.86) (1.40)
Market value sq. - - - -7.25e-08 - - - -7.25e-08
 - - - (-1.31) - - - (-1.31)
Market value sq. * Event day2 - - - -2.96e-07 - - - -2.96e-07
 - - - (-1.13) - - - (-1.13)
Industry1: Depository Institutions -0.000057 -.00026 .00024 .00029 -0.000057 -.00026 .00024 .00029
 (-0.04) (-0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (-0.04) (-0.18) (0.16) (0.20)
Industry1 * Event day2 -0.0081 -.0075 -.0080 -.0078 -0.0081 -.0075 -.0080 -.0078
 (-1.17) (-1.09) (-1.16) (-1.13) (-1.17) (-1.09) (-1.16) (-1.13)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.0010 .00081 .00061 .00069 0.0010 .00081 .00061 .00069
 (0.98) (0.78) (0.59) (0.66) (0.98) (0.78) (0.59) (0.66)
Industry2 * Event day2 -0.0097 -.0097 -.0087 -.0084 -0.0097 -.0097 -.0087 -.0084
 (-1.96)** (-1.98)** (-1.77)* (-1.71)* (-1.96)** (-1.98)** (-1.77)* (-1.71)*
Goodness-of-fit:           
F value 9.36 9.32 9.20 7.74 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjuted R-sq. 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0027 0.0028
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
Return (Industry) – Event day3 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.62 .062 .062 .062 0.62 .062 .062 .062
 (3.03) (3.04) (3.06) (3.05) (3.03) (3.04) (3.06) (3.05)
Market return -0.54 -.54 -.54 -.54 -0.54 -.54 -.54 -.54
 (-3.02)** (-3.02)** (-3.01)** (-3.02)** (-3.02)** (-3.02)** (-3.01)** (-3.02)**
Event day3 0.0044 .019 .026 .024 0.0044 .019 .026 .024
 (1.29) (8.55)** (16.00)** (13.85)** (1.29) (8.55)** (16.00)** (13.85)**
Type of firm 0.0027 - - - 0.0027 - - -
 (1.28) - - - (1.28) - - -
Type of firm * Event day3 0.0073 - - - 0.0073 - - -
 (7.28)** - - - (7.28)** - - -
Type of firm2 - .00087 - - - .00087 - -
 - (1.46) - - - (1.46) - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - .015 - - - .015 - -
 - (5.34)** - - - (5.34)** - -
Market value - - .000017 .000031 - - .000017 .000031
 - - (2.09)** (1.72)* - - (2.09)** (1.72)*
Market value * Event day3 - - .000093 .00035 - - .000093 .00035
 - - (2.35)** (4.07)** - - (2.35)** (4.07)**
Market value sq. - - - -4.68e-08 - - - -4.68e-08
 - - - (-0.85) - - - (-0.85)
Market value sq. * Event day3 - - - -8.77e-07 - - - -8.77e-07
 - - - (-3.37)** - - - (-3.37)**
Industry1: Depository Institutions -0.00026 -.00037 -.000069 -.000037 -0.00026 -.00037 -.000069 -.000037
 (-0.18) (-0.26) (-0.05) (-0.030) (-0.18) (-0.26) (-0.05) (-0.030)
Industry1 * Event day3 -0.0035 -.0049 -.0012 -.00057 -0.0035 -.0049 -.0012 -.00057
 (-0.51) (-0.71) (-0.17) (-0.080) (-0.51) (-0.71) (-0.17) (-0.080)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.00065 .00059 .00052 .00059 0.00065 .00059 .00052 .00059
 (0.62) (0.57) (0.53) (0.57) (0.62) (0.57) (0.53) (0.57)
Industry2 * Event day3 -0.0013 -.0047 -.0071 -.0062 -0.0013 -.0047 -.0071 -.0062
  (-0.27) (-0.95) (-1.46) (-1.27)  (-0.27) (-0.95) (-1.46) (-1.27)
Goodness-of-fit:      
F value 55.44 52.16 49.23 40.79 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.017 0.0163 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.0028 0.0027 0.0028
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
Return (Industry) – Event day4 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.13 .13 .13 .13  0.13 .13 .13 .13
 (6.30) (6.33) (6.36) (6.35) (6.30) (6.33) (6.36) (6.35)
Market return -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12
 (-6.24)** (-6.24)** (-6.25)** (-6.25)** (-6.24)** (-6.24)** (-6.25)** (-6.25)**
Event day4 -0.0053 -.0030 -.0029 -.0034 -0.0053 -.0030 -.0029 -.0034
 (-2.51)** (-2.29)** (-2.95)** (-3.26)** (-2.51)** (-2.29)** (-2.95)** (-3.26)**
Type of firm 0.00045 - - - 0.00045 - - -
 (1.99)** - - - (1.99)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day4 0.0011 - - - 0.0011 - - -
 (1.84)* - - - (1.84)* - - -
Type of firm2 - .0012 - - - .0012** - -
 - (1.97)** - - - (1.97)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - .0022 - - - .0022 - -
 - (1.29) - - - (1.29) - -
Market value - - .000011 .000027 - - .000011 .000027
 - - (1.22) (1.42) - - (1.22) (1.42)
Market value * Event day4 - - .000081 .00015 - - .000081 .00015
 - - (3.34)** (2.80)** - - (3.34)** (2.80)**
Market value sq. - - - -5.58e-08 - - - -5.58e-08
 - - - (-0.96) - - - (-0.96)
Market value sq. * Event day4 - - - -2.24e-07 - - - -2.24e-07
 - - - (-1.41) - - - (-1.41)
Industry1: Depository Institutions -0.00043 -.00058 -.00025 -.00021 -0.00043 -.00058 -.00025 -.00021
 (-0.28) (-0.38) (-0.17) (-0.14) (-0.28) (-0.38) (-0.17) (-0.14)
Industry1 * Event day4 0.00013 -.000065 .00099 .0011 0.00013 -.000065 .00099 .0011
 (0.03) (-0.02) (0.24) (0.27) (0.03) (-0.02) (0.24) (0.27)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.00079 .00065 .00047 .00053 0.00079 .00065 .00047 .00053
 (0.71) (0.60) (0.43) (0.49) (0.71) (0.60) (0.43) (0.49)
Industry2 * Event day4 -0.0015 -.0020 -.0019 -.0016 -0.0015 -.0020 -.0019 -.0016
  (-0.49) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.55)  (-0.49) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.55)
Goodness-of-fit:    
F value 6.87 6.49 7.68 6.59 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0019 0.0018 0.0022 0.0023 0.0019 0.017 0.016 0.016
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
Return (Industry) – Event day5 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
 (6.30) (6.31) (6.34) (6.34) (6.30) (6.31) (6.34) (6.34)
Market return -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12 -1.12
 (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)** (-6.27)**
Event day5 -0.0033 0.010 0.012 0.010 -0.0033 0.010 0.012 0.010
 (-0.95) (4.76)** (7.81)** (5.87)** (-0.95) (4.76)** (7.81)** (5.87)**
Type of firm 0.00032 - - - 0.00032 - - -
 (1.49) - - - (1.49) - - -
Type of firm * Event day5 0.0063 - - - 0.0063 - - -
 (6.23)** - - - (6.23)** - - -
Type of firm2 - 0.0011 - - - 0.0011 - -
 - (1.80)* - - - (1.80)* - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - 0.010 - - - 0.010 - -
 - (3.66)** - - - (3.66)** - -
Market value - - 9.45E-06 0.000020 - - 9.45E-06 0.000020
 - - (1.13) (1.12) - - (1.13) (1.12)
Market value * Event day5 - - 0.00027 0.00059 - - 0.00027 0.00059
 - - (6.86)** (6.89)** - - (6.86)** (6.89)**
Market value sq. - - - -3.72E-08 - - - -3.72E-08
 - - - (-0.67) - - - (-0.67)
Market value sq. * Event day5 - - - -1.09E-06 - - - -1.09E-06
 - - - (-4.18)** - - - (-4.18)**
Industry1: Depository Institutions -0.00021 -0.00036 -0.000073 -0.000047 -0.00021 -0.00036 -0.000073 -0.000047
 (-0.15) (-0.25) (-0.05) (-0.03) (-0.15) (-0.25) (-0.05) (-0.03)
Industry1 * Event day4 -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0011 -0.00033 -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0011 -0.00033
 (-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.16) (-0.05) (-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.16) (-0.05)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.00080 0.00074 0.00058 0.00062 0.00080 0.00074 0.00058 0.00062
 (0.76) (0.71) (0.57) (0.60) (0.76) (0.71) (0.57) (0.60)
Industry2 * Event day4 -0.0046 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0070 -0.0046 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0070
  (-0.93) (-1.64)* (-1.67)* (-1.43)  (-0.93) (-1.64)* (-1.67)* (-1.43)
Goodness-of-fit:      
F value 25.46 22.09 26.32 23.08 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.045 0.045 0.045 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.0079 0.0068 0.0081 0.0089 0.0080 0.0069 0.0083 0.0090
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
 
Table 6 – Empirical Results of Stock Abnormal Returns In Relation to the Opaque Industries 
 
AR (Industry) – Event day OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.16 0.14 0.14 .14 0.16 .14 .14 .14
 (6.17) (5.57) (5.50) (5.57) (7.18) (6.57) (6.48) (6.55)
Market return -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17 -2.17
 (-9.76)** (-9.69)** (-9.70)** (-9.72)** (-11.46)** (-11.46)** (-11.46)** (-11.46)**
Event day -0.0046 -.0023 -0.0012 -.0015 -0.0046 -.0023 -.0012 -.0015
 (-2.66)** (-2.09)** (-1.48) (-1.76)* (-3.12)** (-2.48)** (-1.75)* (-2.08)**
Type of firm -0.0058 - - - -0.0058 - - -
 (-15.38)** - - - (-6.28)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day 0.0012 - - - 0.0012 - - -
 (2.44)** - - - (2.87)** - - -
Type of firm2 - -.0070 - - - -.0070 - -
 - (-6.50)** - - - (-2.61)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - .0027 - - - .0027 - -
 - (1.91)* - - - (2.26)** - -
Market value - - -0.00013 -.00033 - - -.00013 -.00033
 - - (-8.70)** (-10.30)** - - (-3.51)** (-4.17)**
Market value * Event day - - 0.000030 .000071 - - .000030 .000071
 - - (1.52) (1.67)* - - (1.79)* (1.97)**
Market value sq. - - - 6.96e-07 - - - 6.96e-07
 - - - (7.06)** - - - (2.85)**
Market value sq. * Event day - - - -1.41e-07 - - - -1.41e-07
 - - - (-1.09) - - - (-1.28)
Industry1: Depository Institutions 0.0055 0.0056 0.0032 .0028 0.0055 .0056 .0032 .0028
 (2.13)** (2.15)** (1.24) (1.06) (0.87) (0.87) (0.50) (0.43)
Industry1 * Event day -0.00086 -0.001134 -0.000367 -.00027 -0.00086 -.0011 -.00037 -.00027
 (-0.25) (-0.33) (-0.11) (-0.08) (-0.30) (-0.39) (-0.13) (-0.09)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.012 0.016 0.017 .016 0.012 .016 .017 .016
 (6.67)** (8.69)** (9.00)** (8.60)** (2.72)** (3.49)** (3.63)** (3.48)**
Industry2 * Event day 0.0010 0.0005191 0.0001803 .00033 0.0010 .00052 .00018 .00033
  (0.42) (0.21) (0.07) (0.14)  (0.50) (0.25) (0.09) (0.16)
Goodness-of-fit:    
F value 94.86 47.36 56.66 54.8 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.030 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.0060 0.0059 0.0058 0.0059
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
AR (Industry) – Event day1 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.13 .12 .12 .12 0.13 .12 .12 .12
 (5.32) (4.77) (4.72) (4.78) (6.19) (5.62) (5.56) (5.63)
Market return -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96
 (-9.08)** (-9.02)** (-9.03)** (-9.05)** (-10.67)** (-10.67)** (-10.67)** (-10.67)**
Event day1 -0.0015 -.0042 -.0049 -.0043 -0.0015 -.0042 -.0049 -.0043
 (-0.36) (-1.60) (-2.53)** (-2.07)** (-0.42) (-1.89)* (-2.99)** (-2.44)**
Type of firm -0.0051 - - - -0.0051 - - -
 (-20.12)** - - - (-5.66)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day1 -0.0013 - - - -0.0012 - - -
 (-1.07) - - - (-1.25) - - -
Type of firm2 - -.0053 - - - -.0053 - -
 - (-7.45)** - - - (-2.06)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -.0022 - - - -.0022 - -
 - (-0.66) - - - (-0.78) - -
Market value - - -.00011 -.00029 - - -.00011 -.00029
 - - (-11.19)** (-13.33)** - - (-3.10)** (-3.71)**
Market value * Event day1 - - -.000037 -.00012 - - -.000037 -.00012
 - - (-0.79) (-1.19) - - (-0.93) (-1.41)
Market value sq. - - - 6.01e-07 - - - 6.01e-07
 - - - (9.17)** - - - (2.55)**
Market value sq. * Event day1 - - - 2.89e-07 - - - 2.89e-07
 - - - (0.93) - - - (1.10)
Industry1: Depository Institutions 0.0046 .0045 .0026 .0022 0.0046 .0045 .0026 .0022
 (2.68)** (2.62)** (1.52) (1.28) (0.75) (0.72) (0.42) (0.36)
Industry1 * Event day1 0.0094 .0096 .0089 .0087 0.0094 .0096 .0089 .0087
 (1.16) (1.17) (1.09) (1.06) (1.36) (1.38) (1.28) (1.25)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.013 .016 .016 .016 0.013 .016 .016 .016
 (10.33)** (13.10)** (13.41)** (12.89)** (2.90) (3.62)** (3.72)** (3.59)**
Industry2 * Event day1 0.0052 .0059 .0061 .0057 0.0052 .0059 .0061 .0057
  (0.89) (1.00) (1.04) (0.99)  (1.04) (1.19) (1.23) (1.17)
Goodness-of-fit:    
F value 95.22 47.91 57.41 55.37 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.030 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.0062 0.0061 0.0061 0.0062
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
AR (Industry) – Event day2 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.16 .15 .15 .15 0.16 0.15 .15 .15
 (6.65) (6.08) (6.03) (6.10) (7.73) (7.16) (7.11) (7.18)
Market return -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23 -2.23
 (-10.46)** (-10.38)** (-10.40)** (-10.41)** (-12.29)** (-12.29)** (-12.29)** (-12.29)**
Event day2 -0.0031 -.0038 -.0063 -.0070 -0.0031 -0.0038 -.0063 -.0070
 (-0.76) (-1.45) (-3.28)** (-3.41)** (-0.89) (-1.71)* (-3.87)** (-4.02)**
Type of firm -0.0051 - - - -0.0051 - - -
 (-20.19)** - - - (-5.68)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day2 -0.00089 - - - -0.00089 - - -
 (-0.74) - - - (-0.87) - - -
Type of firm2 - -.0053 - - - -0.0053 - -
 - (-7.36)** - - - (-2.03)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - -.0037 - - - -0.0038 - -
 - (-1.10) - - - (-1.31) - -
Market value - - -.00012 -.00030 - - -.00012 -.00030
 - - (-11.52)** (-13.84)** - - (-3.19)** (-3.85)**
Market value * Event day2 - - .000034 .00012 - - .000034 .00012
 - - (0.72) (1.18) - - (0.86) (1.39)
Market value sq. - - - 6.27e-07 - - - 6.27e-07
 - - - (9.57)** - - - (2.66)**
Market value sq. * Event day2 - - - -2.96e-07 - - - -2.96e-07
 - - - (-0.95) - - - (-1.13)
Industry1: Depository Institutions 0.0054 .0053 .00337 .0029 0.0054 0.0053 .00337 .0029
 (3.13)** (3.06)** (1.96)** (1.71)* (0.88) (0.84) (0.54) (0.48)
Industry1 * Event day2 -0.0081 -.0075 -.0080 -.0078 -0.0081 -0.0075 -.0080 -.0078
 (-1.00) (-0.92) (-0.98) (-0.96) (-1.17) (-1.09) (-1.16) (-1.13)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.013 .017 .017 .016 0.013 0.017 .017 .016
 (10.87)** (13.67)** (13.94)** (13.41)** (3.06)** (3.77)** (3.86)** (3.73)**
Industry2 * Event day2 -0.0097 -.0097 -.0087 -.0084 -0.0097 -0.0097 -.0087 -.0084
  (-1.66)* (-1.66)* (-1.49) (-1.44)  (-1.95)** (-1.97)** (-1.76)* (-1.70)*
Goodness-of-fit:     
F value 96.64 49.46 58.85 56.54 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.030 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
AR (Industry) – Event day3 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.082 .069 .067 .068 0.082 .069 .067 .068
 (3.42) (2.84) (2.77) (2.83) (3.98) (3.35) (3.27) (3.34)
Market return -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54 -1.54
 (-7.26)** (-7.20)** (-7.21)** (-7.22)** (-8.54)** (-8.54)** (-8.54)** (-8.54)**
Event day3 0.0044 .019 .026 .024 0.0044 .019 .026 .024
 (1.09) (7.17)** (13.44)** (11.67)** (1.28) (8.51)** (15.92)** (13.79)**
Type of firm -0.0055 - - - -0.0055 - - -
 (-21.76)** - - - (-6.08)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day3 0.0073 - - - 0.0073 - - -
 (6.16)** - - - (7.25)** - - -
Type of firm2 - -.0061 - - - -.0061 - -
 - (-8.57)** - - - (-2.36)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - .015 - - - .015 - -
 - (4.48)** - - - (5.32)** - -
Market value - - -.00012 -.00031 - - -.00012 -.00031
 - - (-11.83)** (-14.38)** - - (-3.26)** (-3.98)**
Market value * Event day3 - - .000093 .00035 - - .000093 .00035
 - - (1.97)** (3.43)** - - (2.34)** (4.05)**
Market value sq. - - - 6.53e-07 - - - 6.53e-07
 - - - (10.01)** - - - (2.77)**
Market value sq. * Event day3 - - - -8.77e-07 - - - -8.77e-07
 - - - (-2.83)** - - - (-3.35)**
Industry1: Depository Institutions 0.0052 .0052 .0031 .0026 0.0052 .0052 .0031 .0026
 (3.03)** (3.00)** (1.79)* (1.53) (0.85) (0.83) (0.49) (0.42)
Industry1 * Event day3 -0.0035 -.0049 -.0012 -.00057 -0.0035 -.0049 -.0012 -.00057
 (-0.43) (-0.60) (-0.14) (-0.07) (-0.51) (-0.71) (-0.17) (-0.08)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.0073 .017 .017 .016 0.013 .017 .017 .016
 (6.16)** (13.55)** (13.95)** (13.39)** (2.97)** (3.72)** (3.85)** (3.71)**
Industry2 * Event day3 -0.0013 -.0047 -.0071 -.0062 -0.0013 -.0047 -.0071 -.0062
 (-0.22) (-0.80) (-1.23) (-1.07) (-0.26) (-0.95) (-1.46) (-1.26)
Goodness-of-fit:             
F value 130.49 80.01 87.59 80.44 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.040 0.025 0.027 0.032 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
AR (Industry) – Event day4 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.15 .14 .13 .14  0.015 .14 .13 .14
 (6.20) (5.61) (5.56) (5.63) (7.20) (6.61) (6.55) (6.62)
Market return -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12
 (-10.02)** (-9.95)** (-9.96)** (-9.98)** (-11.77)** (-11.77)** (-11.78)** (-11.78)**
Event day4 -0.0053 -.0030 -.0029 -.0034 -0.0053 -.0030 -.0029 -.0034
 (-2.13)** (-1.92)** (-2.48)** (-2.75)** (-2.50)** (-2.28)** (-2.93)** (-3.24)**
Type of firm -0.003 - - - -0.0053 - - -
 (-19.94)** - - - (-5.87)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day4 0.0011 - - - 0.0011 - - -
 (1.56) - - - (1.83)* - - -
Type of firm2 - -.0057 - - - -.0057 - -
 - (-7.62)** - - - (-2.21)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - .0022 - - - .0022 - -
 - (1.08) - - - (1.28) - -
Market value - - -.00012 -.00031 - - -.00012 -.00031
 - - (-11.85)** (-13.80)** - - (-3.44)** (-4.02)**
Market value * Event day4 - - .000081** .00015** - - .000081** .00015**
 - - (2.81)** (2.36)** - - (3.32)** (2.79)**
Market value sq. - - - 6.44e-07 - - - 6.44e-07
 - - - (9.36)** - - - (2.73)**
Market value sq. * Event day4 - - - -2.24e-07 - - - -2.24e-07
 - - - (-1.19) - - - (-1.40)
Industry1: Depository Institutions 0.0050 .0050** .0029 .0024 0.0050 .0050 .0029 .0024
 (2.77)** (2.73)** (1.59) (1.35) (0.82) (0.79) (0.46) (0.39)
Industry1 * Event day4 0.00013 -.000065 .00099 .0011 0.00013 -.000065 .00099 .0011
 (0.03) (-0.01) (0.20) (0.23) (0.03) (-0.02) (0.24) (0.27)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.013 .017** .017** .016** 0.013 .017** .017** .016**
 (10.17)** (12.88)** (13.17)** (12.64)** (2.99)** (3.73)** (3.82)** (3.68)**
Industry2 * Event day4 -0.0015 -.0020 -.0019 -.0016 -0.0015 -.0020 -.0019 -.0016
  (-0.42) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-0.46)  (-0.49) (-0.67) (-0.63) (-0.55)
Goodness-of-fit:    
F value 94.80 47.43 57.76 55.71 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.030 0.015 0.018 0.022 0.0060 0.0059 0.0063 0.0064
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
          
 
AR (Industry) – Event day5 OLS  GLS 
Exogenous variables (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13  0.015 0.13 0.13 0.013
 (6.20) (5.59) (5.54) (5.61) (7.21) (6.59) (6.54) (6.61)
Market return -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12 -2.12
 (-10.06)** (-9.98)** (-10.00)** (-10.02)** (-11.83)** (-11.82)** (-11.83)** (-11.84)**
Event day5 -0.0033 0.010 0.012 0.010 -0.0033 0.10 0.012 0.010
 (-0.80) (4.00)** (6.57)** (4.95)** (-0.94) (4.73)** (7.78)** (5.84)**
Type of firm -0.0054 - - - -0.0054 - - -
 (-21.50)** - - - (-6.03)** - - -
Type of firm * Event day5 0.0063 - - - 0.0063 - - -
 (5.28)** - - - (6.20)** - - -
Type of firm2 - -0.0059 - - - -0.0059 - -
 - (-8.25)** - - - (-2.28)** - -
Type of firm2 * Event day - 0.010 - - - 0.010 - -
 - (3.08)** - - - (3.64)** - -
Market value - - -0.00013 -0.00032 - - -0.00013 -0.00032
 - - (-12.60)** (-14.84)** - - (-3.49)** (-4.12)**
Market value * Event day5 - - 0.00027 0.00059 - - 0.00027 0.00059
 - - (5.77)** (5.81)** - - (6.83)** (6.86)**
Market value sq. - - - 6.63E-07 - - - 6.63E-07
 - - - (10.14)** - - - (2.81)**
Market value sq. * Event day5 - - - -1.09E-06 - - - -1.09E-06
 - - - (-3.52)** - - - (-4.16)**
Industry1: Depository Institutions 0.0052 0.0052 0.0031 0.0026 0.0052 0.0052 0.0031 0.0026
 (3.04)** (3.00)** (1.78)* (1.52) (0.85) (0.83) (0.49) (0.42)
Industry1 * Event day4 -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0011 -0.00033 -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0012 -0.00033
 (-0.56) (-0.64) (-0.13) (-0.04) (-0.66) (-0.76) (-0.16) (-0.05)
Industry2: Insurance Carriers 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.016
 (10.70)** (13.62)** (13.95)** (13.39)** (3.00)** (3.76)** (3.86)** (3.72)**
Industry2 * Event day4 -0.0046 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0070 -0.0046 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0070
  (-0.79) (-1.38) (-1.40) (-1.20)  (-0.93) (-1.63)* (-1.66)* (-1.42)
Goodness-of-fit:             
F value 108.49 58.59 71.17 67.65 - - - -
Root MSE 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 - - - -
Adjusted R-sq. 0.034 0.018 0.022 0.026 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013
Observations 24660 24660 24660 24660  24660 24660 24660 24660
Figure 1 – Visual Examination of Heteroscedasticity  
 


































Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
 
SOX has eleven sections that include provisions regulating corporate entities, such as 
accounting firms, financial analysts, corporate officers, and corporate directors.  Title I of the Act 
establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that registers public accounting 
firms, establishes standards related to preparation of audit reports to issuers, and oversee public 
accounting firms.  Title II addresses issues related to auditor independence.  It imposes 
restrictions on public accounting firms by mandating public accounting firms not to provide any 
non auditing services simultaneously with the auditing services, and requiring those firms to 
rotate the coordinating auditing partner and the reviewing auditing partner every 5 years.  Title 
III illustrates responsibilities of the corporations, which include requirement for independent 
audit committee, executive certification of financial reports, and forfeiture of certain bonuses and 
profits upon financial restatements.  Title IV mandates financial disclosure and internal controls 
of companies.  It prohibits personal loans to executives, and requires disclosure of managerial 
assessment of internal controls and disclosure of audit committee financial expert.  Title V, VI, 
and VII illustrate treatment of analyst conflicts of interest, S.E.C. resources and authority, and 
studies and reports regarding consolidation of public accounting firms, credit rating agencies, 
violators and violations, enforcement actions, and investment banks.  Title VIII, IX, and XI 
impose increased penalties for corporate fraud, while title X addresses corporate tax returns 
matters.   
Appendix III 
 
Other return models that are also used in event studies include: 
 
1. The constant expected returns model: Rit = μi + eit  
where, Rit is the return for stock i over time period t, μi is the expected return for stock i, 
and eit is the usual statistical error term.  
 
2. The market model: 
Rit = ai + bi * Rmt + eit  
where, ai and bi are firm-specific parameters, and Rmt is the market return for the period t. 
 
3. The arbitrage pricing model: 
Rit = δ0 + δi1F1t + δi2F2t + ... + δinFnt + eit  
where, F1, F2,..., Fn are the returns on the n factors that generate returns, and δ are the 
factor loadings. 
 
4. The Fama-French three factor model: 
r   -   Rf   =   beta3 * ( Km - Rf )   +   bs * SMB   +   bv * HML   +   alpha 
where, r is the portfolio's return, Rf is the risk-free return, and Km is the market return; 
beta3 is analogous to the classical beta; SMB is the small [cap] minus big [cap], HML is 
the high [book/price] minus low. 
 
